Special relativity shows that whether two events are simultaneous depends on the observer's reference frame — there is no frame-independent 'happening now.' Which philosophical view does this most directly challenge?
AB-theory, because it relies on fixed tenseless relations like 'earlier than'
BA-theory (particularly presentism), because it requires an objective universal 'now' that relativity denies
CBoth equally, since relativity eliminates all temporal distinctions
DNeither — relativity is a physical theory with no implications for metaphysics of time
A-theory — especially presentism (only the present exists) — requires an objective, universal present moment. But special relativity eliminates absolute simultaneity: two events can be simultaneous in one frame and non-simultaneous in another, with no frame being privileged. There is no observer-independent fact about 'what exists now,' which is exactly what presentism requires. B-theory is untroubled because it treats 'now' as a mere indexical and all times as equally real in a four-dimensional manifold — there is no privileged present to threaten.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
On the B-theory of time, how is 'change' analyzed?
AChange is illusory — in a static block universe, nothing genuinely changes
BChange consists in an object having different properties at different times, understood as differences between its temporal stages
CChange requires an objective flow of time from past to future
DChange is reducible to the subjective experience of temporal passage, not a feature of the world
B-theorists do not deny that change occurs — they analyze it differently. Change is the fact that an object has different properties at different times: 'the leaf was green in July and is brown in October' is true just in case the leaf's temporal stage at July has the property green and its stage at October has the property brown. No temporal flow is needed — only the four-dimensional manifold with tenseless earlier-than relations. This refutes the misconception that B-theorists claim nothing changes.
Question 3 True / False
B-theorists claim that hardly anything genuinely changes because they hold that most times exist equally in a static four-dimensional block.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This is the most common mischaracterization of B-theory. B-theorists do analyze change: they understand it as an object having different properties at different times (or across temporal stages), without requiring an objective flow of time. The block universe view says that change is tenseless temporal variation in properties, not the passage of a privileged present. B-theorists accept all ordinary facts about change; they just don't think those facts require genuine temporal becoming.
Question 4 True / False
On the B-theory, 'now' functions as an indexical — like 'here' — referring to whatever time the utterance is produced, with no special ontological priority over other times.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is a central B-theory claim. Just as 'here' refers to the speaker's spatial location without that location being metaphysically privileged, 'now' refers to the time of utterance without that time being ontologically privileged. The present is not 'more real' than past or future; it is just the temporal location of the current speaker. This contrasts with A-theory, which holds that the present is the genuinely existing, objectively distinguished moment.
Question 5 Short Answer
What is the 'truthmaker problem' for presentism, and why does it pose a philosophical difficulty?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Presentism holds that only the present exists. The truthmaker problem asks: if past entities no longer exist, what makes past-tensed statements like 'Caesar was murdered' true right now? Truth requires truthmakers — entities in the world that ground the truth of propositions. But on presentism, Caesar, the senators, and all events of 44 BCE are gone. There is nothing currently existing to serve as the truthmaker for that claim. Proposed solutions include abstract ersatz past times or primitive temporal operators, but each faces objections about what these substitutes are and how they ground truth.
B-theorists avoid this problem entirely: for them, Caesar and the assassination exist timelessly at their temporal location in the four-dimensional manifold, serving as truthmakers for past-tensed claims just as present entities ground present-tensed ones. The truthmaker problem reveals a tension at the core of presentism between the intuitive view that only now is real and the equally intuitive truth of historical claims.