Questions: Alliance Formation and Balancing Behavior

Question 1

Canada and the United States have an enormous power asymmetry — the US is vastly more capable militarily and economically. Yet Canada does not build balancing alliances against the US. According to Walt's balance-of-threat theory, what best explains this?

• A. Canada is too small to balance effectively, so it rationally bandwagons instead
• B. The US does not display aggressive intent toward Canada, so Canada perceives no threat despite the power gap
• C. Geographic contiguity prevents balancing because the US could retaliate faster than a coalition could form
• D. Democratic peace theory prevents Canada from viewing another democracy as a threat

Answer: (B)

Walt's refinement of balance-of-power theory holds that states balance against *threats*, not power alone. Threat perception is a function of aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and aggressive intentions. The US has enormous power and is geographically adjacent, but it does not direct aggressive intent toward Canada — so no threat is perceived, and no balancing occurs. Option A mistakes the mechanism: small states can and do balance when threatened enough. Option D introduces a different theoretical framework. The Canada-US case is Walt's own evidence for why power alone is an insufficient predictor of balancing behavior.

Question 2

In 1940, France fell to Nazi Germany in six weeks. Rather than joining Germany (bandwagoning), Britain and other states continued to resist. What does this pattern most directly support?

• A. States always prefer balancing to bandwagoning regardless of the power differential
• B. States balance against threats even when the threatening power holds an overwhelming military advantage
• C. Balancing coalitions always succeed in preventing hegemony if they persist
• D. States only balance when their own military capabilities are roughly equivalent to the threatening power

Answer: (B)

This case supports the classical balance-of-power prediction: states fear domination enough to resist even an apparently overwhelming power rather than submit. Britain's continued resistance after France's fall — despite Germany's evident military superiority — illustrates that the fear of living under domination drove balancing even when the odds were unfavorable. Option A is too absolute; some states did bandwagon with Germany (Romania, Hungary). Option C is falsified by the historical outcome — balancing did not prevent hegemony in continental Europe in 1940. Option D contradicts the evidence.

Question 3

According to Walt's balance-of-threat theory, a state with modest military capabilities but visibly expansionist intentions can trigger balancing coalitions that a more powerful but restrained state would not.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

Threat is a composite of aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability, and perceived aggressive intent. A modest but aggressive state scores high on intent and offensive capability even if it lacks raw power, and can therefore appear more threatening than a powerful but restrained neighbor. This explains why Saddam Hussein's Iraq triggered regional coalition behavior despite having limited power relative to great powers, while some powerful states with defensive postures do not provoke the same response. States can actively reduce balancing incentives against themselves by signaling restraint.

Question 4

External balancing (forming alliances) is typically preferable to internal balancing (building military capability) because it multiplies power faster and at lower cost.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

Both methods have genuine tradeoffs. External balancing is faster and cheaper — it adds allied capabilities without long military investment lead times — but comes with entanglement risks, commitment problems, and dependence on partners whose interests may diverge. Internal balancing is slower and more expensive but preserves strategic autonomy. Most states use both, calibrating the mix to their resources, timeline, and the reliability of potential allies. 'Always preferable' is too strong; external balancing's costs (entrapment in allies' conflicts, loss of independent decision-making) can outweigh its speed advantages in certain strategic environments.

Question 5

Why do states sometimes bandwagon instead of balance, and what conditions make each strategy more likely?

Model answer: States bandwagon — join the stronger side — when balancing seems futile (no capable coalition partners available), when the rising power offers concrete benefits for alignment, or when the costs of resisting seem higher than the costs of accommodation. Balancing is more likely when a coalition of sufficient capability exists, when the threat is severe enough that submission is unacceptable, and when potential allies share the threat perception strongly enough to make commitments credible.

The key variables are feasibility and threat intensity. A small state surrounded by a regional hegemon with no nearby great powers to appeal to may rationally conclude that balancing is hopeless — accommodation at least offers survival. States with access to powerful balancing partners who share the threat perception are much more likely to resist. Historically, bandwagoning tends to occur at the margins of a threatened coalition (states that are geographically exposed or ideologically sympathetic to the rising power), while core states with strong interests in resisting tend to balance. The choice is strategic, not ideological.