Questions: Anomalous Monism

Question 1

Davidson holds three non-negotiable claims: mental events cause physical events; causation is backed by strict laws; and there are no strict psychophysical laws. How does he resolve the apparent contradiction?

• A. He denies the first claim — mental events do not genuinely cause physical events; only physical events cause physical events
• B. He denies the second claim — mental causation is a distinct kind of causal relation that does not require backing by strict laws
• C. He holds that each mental event token is identical to some physical event token, so mental events cause things by falling under physical causal laws under their physical description
• D. He posits special psychophysical bridge laws that connect mental descriptions to physical descriptions, making mental causation lawful after all

Answer: (C)

Davidson's resolution is token-token identity: every individual mental event is identical to some individual physical event. The mental event causes things not under its mental description (where no strict laws apply) but under its physical description (where physical causal laws do apply). This preserves all three claims: mental events are causally efficacious (claim 1) because they are physical events; causation is backed by laws (claim 2) at the physical level; and no systematic psychophysical bridge laws are needed (claim 3) because the identity is at the token level, not the type level.

Question 2

Jaegwon Kim's exclusion argument targets anomalous monism by arguing that:

• A. Mental events cannot be identical to physical events because mental and physical predicates have incompatible logical forms
• B. If physical causes are sufficient for physical effects, and mental properties are not identical to physical properties at the type level, then mental properties do no independent causal work and are epiphenomenal
• C. Davidson's principle of charity makes psychological explanation circular and non-explanatory
• D. Token identity without type identity makes event individuation indeterminate, undermining the identity claim

Answer: (B)

Kim's exclusion argument: physical events have sufficient physical causes. If mental properties are not type-identical to physical properties, then when a mental property (say, being a belief) coincides with a physical state, the physical state is doing all the causal work. The mental property is along for the ride — present but causally inert. Davidson insists mental event *tokens* are causally efficacious, but Kim presses that the mental *properties* — what makes the event a belief rather than just a neural firing — do nothing. This is the sense in which anomalous monism may save mental causation at the event level while losing it at the property level.

Question 3

In anomalous monism, each individual mental event token is identical to some physical event token, even though mental event types cannot be reduced to physical event types.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is the defining feature of anomalous monism: monism at the token level (each mental event = some physical event), combined with irreducibility at the type level (no systematic bridge laws connecting mental types to physical types). The 'anomalous' part names the type-level irreducibility: mental descriptions are governed by norms of rationality that have no analog in physical description, making systematic psychophysical laws impossible. The 'monism' part names the token-level identity: there is only one kind of stuff (the physical), and mental events are physical events under a different description.

Question 4

Anomalous monism is a version of type identity theory: it holds that mental types (like pain or belief) are identical to physical types (like C-fiber firing), while acknowledging exceptions in unusual cases.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

Anomalous monism explicitly rejects type identity theory. Type identity (Smart, Place) holds that mental *types* are identical to physical types — pain = C-fiber firing for all instances. Davidson denies this entirely: there are no strict psychophysical laws, no systematic mapping of mental types onto physical types. What Davidson accepts is only token identity — each individual mental event instance is identical to some physical event instance, but there is no general rule saying which mental type corresponds to which physical type. This is the core of what makes the position 'anomalous.'

Question 5

What does Davidson mean by saying that mental descriptions are 'anomalous'? Why do norms of rationality make mental description constitutively different from physical description, and what does this imply about the possibility of strict psychophysical laws?

Model answer: Mental descriptions are 'anomalous' in the technical sense: mental events described under mental predicates do not fall under strict causal laws. Davidson's reason is that mental description is normatively constituted — to attribute beliefs, desires, and intentions to an agent, you must interpret them as broadly rational. You cannot assign mental states without making the agent's overall psychology cohere. Physical description has no such constraint: a brain state is whatever it is, regardless of whether it is rational. Because the standards governing mental and physical description are constitutively different in kind, no systematic bridge law — 'whenever mental type M, then physical type P' — can hold. The rational and the nomological operate under different principles.

This is the deepest commitment in Davidson's position. The argument is not empirical (we haven't found the laws yet) but conceptual (the nature of mental description makes such laws impossible in principle). Rationalizing explanation — explaining behavior by citing reasons — requires holistic interpretation under norms of coherence and rationality. Causal explanation under strict laws requires only nomological regularities, with no normative dimension. These are two distinct explanatory frameworks, and their constitutive differences prevent reduction of one to the other, no matter how detailed our neuroscience becomes.