Someone who is not an ordained minister says 'I now pronounce you married' at a wedding ceremony. According to Austin, this utterance is best described as:
AFalse — the couple is not actually married
BTrue — the words were spoken sincerely and publicly
CInfelicitous — it fails because the speaker lacks the proper authority and conditions
DA constative — it describes a state of affairs rather than enacting one
Austin argues that performative utterances are not evaluated as true or false but as felicitous or infelicitous — successful or failed. A performative fails when its conditions of felicity are not met: the speaker must have the appropriate authority, the correct procedure must be followed, and so on. An unauthorized pronouncement doesn't produce a false marriage — it produces no marriage at all. Option A applies the wrong evaluative framework (truth-value) to a performative.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Why did Austin later question his own constative/performative distinction?
AHe found that constative utterances are also subject to felicity conditions, not just truth evaluation
BHe realized that performatives could be evaluated as true or false after all
CHe concluded that most ordinary language is neither constative nor performative
DHe decided the distinction was linguistically useful but philosophically trivial
Austin's mature view (his locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary framework) dissolved the original distinction because even 'constative' statements like 'The cat is on the mat' are subject to felicity conditions — they presuppose a context, an audience, appropriate circumstances. If performatives can be evaluated for the presuppositional truth of what they assume, and constatives are always performing some act (asserting, claiming, describing), the sharp line between the two categories collapses.
Question 3 True / False
'I promise to return your book' performs an action rather than merely describing the speaker's mental state.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is Austin's central insight. Saying 'I promise' does not describe a pre-existing promise or report an inner intention — it creates the promise in the very act of utterance. The same logic applies to 'I apologize,' 'I bet,' 'I name this ship.' These are performative utterances: saying them is doing them. Contrast this with 'She promised to return the book,' which does describe a past act.
Question 4 True / False
Performative utterances are mostly exempt from any form of truth evaluation.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This is a common overgeneralization. While performatives cannot be straightforwardly true or false (a promise isn't true or false), they are not immune to all truth-related assessment. Their presuppositions can be evaluated: 'I hereby bequeath you my estate' presupposes that the speaker owns an estate. If they do not, the utterance misfires, and the presupposition is false. Austin's point is that the primary evaluative framework for performatives is felicity (success/failure), not truth-value — not that truth is entirely irrelevant.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does Austin argue that 'I do' in a wedding ceremony cannot be evaluated as true or false, and what criteria should be used to evaluate it instead?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: 'I do' doesn't describe a fact about the world — it enacts the act of consenting to marriage. There is no proposition to be true or false. It should instead be evaluated by its felicity conditions: Was the proper procedure followed? Did the speaker have standing? Was the context appropriate? If all conditions are met, the utterance succeeds (is felicitous); if conditions fail, it misfires or is void.
Austin's insight is that the truth/false framework only applies to utterances that make statements about how things are. Many utterances — promises, verdicts, declarations, vows — don't describe reality; they change it. Applying truth-evaluation to 'I do' is a category error. The right question is not 'Is this true?' but 'Did this act succeed?' — which requires checking the conditions under which such acts can be validly performed.