Country X becomes the dominant military power in its region. According to balance-of-power theory, what is the most likely response from neighboring countries A, B, and C?
AThey will ally with X to gain security guarantees from the dominant power
BThey will increase their own military capabilities and/or form a coalition against X to deny it hegemony
CThey will remain neutral to avoid provoking X into aggression
DThey will defer to X, since resistance is strategically futile against a dominant power
Balance-of-power theory predicts balancing as the dominant response — not deference, neutrality, or bandwagoning with the rising power. When one state accumulates enough power to threaten the rest, others face an existential incentive to counteract it through internal balancing (building capabilities) and external balancing (forming alliances). Option A describes bandwagoning, which the theory treats as the exception, typically chosen only by weak states with no realistic resistance options.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Canada does not ally against the United States despite American power being vastly greater. Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory would explain this by:
AArguing that Canada is bandwagoning with American power and choosing the winning side
BNoting that the U.S. lacks the geographic proximity, offensive posture, and aggressive intentions toward Canada that would make it a genuine threat, despite its capabilities
CPointing out that Canada lacks sufficient military capability to form a meaningful alliance against the U.S.
DSuggesting that balance-of-power theory simply fails to explain Canada-U.S. relations
Walt's refinement of balance-of-power theory argues that states balance against threats, not merely against power. Threat is a function of aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived aggressive intentions. The U.S. has enormous power but poses no realistic territorial or existential threat to Canada — hence no balancing. This also explains why Western European states allied with the U.S. against the Soviet Union rather than balancing against American power: the USSR was the perceived threat.
Question 3 True / False
Balance-of-power theory predicts that when one state rises to dominance, weaker states will typically align with it (bandwagon) to avoid being on the losing side.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Balance-of-power theory predicts the opposite — balancing, not bandwagoning. States threatened by a rising power are predicted to ally against it and build countervailing capabilities. Bandwagoning (joining the dominant state) is treated as the exception, typically adopted by very weak states with no realistic chance of successful resistance. The entire logic of the theory rests on the claim that power begets counterpower, producing systemic equilibrium rather than unchecked hegemony.
Question 4 True / False
Internal balancing and external balancing are two distinct means through which states respond to a rising power: one involves building domestic military and economic capabilities, the other involves forming alliances with other threatened states.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Both are balance-of-power responses to a threatening state. Internal balancing means investing in your own military, economy, or technology independently. External balancing means forging alliances with others who share the same threat — pooling capabilities without necessarily expanding domestic power. States typically use both simultaneously, choosing the mix based on resources, alliance availability, and the urgency of the threat.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does balance-of-power theory predict that hegemony is inherently unstable? What mechanism prevents any single state from maintaining permanent dominance?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: As one state accumulates enough power to potentially dominate all others, those others face an existential security threat regardless of the dominant state's intentions. This triggers balancing: threatened states build their own capabilities (internal balancing) and form coalitions (external balancing). The combined power of the balancing coalition typically exceeds what the potential hegemon can sustain against. The mechanism is structural — it operates from the anarchic nature of the international system, not from any state's ideology or choice.
Waltz's structural realism argues this pattern recurs throughout history precisely because it is driven by structure, not policy. Napoleon's France, the German Reich, and the Soviet Union all triggered balancing coalitions despite very different ideological characteristics. The Concert of Europe, the WWI Entente, and NATO all reflect this logic. The prediction is not that hegemony never happens, but that it reliably generates its own opposition — making permanent dominance structurally difficult to achieve.