Questions: Categorical and Dispositional Properties

Question 1

A glass vase sits in a museum, never touched, for 500 years. At no point is it ever struck or dropped. Which of the following is true about its fragility?

• A. It had no fragility, because fragility is only confirmed when the object actually shatters
• B. It had fragility throughout — the property is defined by what would happen under appropriate conditions, not by whether those conditions ever occur
• C. Whether it was fragile is indeterminate, because the counterfactual was never tested
• D. It had fragility only during periods when breakage was possible, such as when people were nearby

Answer: (B)

Fragility is a dispositional property: it is defined by what an object would do under appropriate circumstances (shattering when struck), not by whether those circumstances ever arise. The glass possesses or lacks fragility right now, in virtue of its current microstructure — independent of whether it is ever tested. This is the philosophical puzzle of dispositions: they seem to involve a 'reach' toward counterfactual situations. Option A is the classic misconception — conflating the manifestation of a disposition with the disposition itself.

Question 2

Dispositionalism (the 'powers' view) and categoricalism disagree fundamentally about laws of nature. What is the key difference?

• A. Dispositionalism holds that laws are discovered empirically; categoricalism holds they are known a priori
• B. Dispositionalism treats fundamental properties as powers that necessitate their effects; categoricalism treats laws as external constraints on an otherwise inert, categorically described world
• C. Dispositionalism applies only to macroscopic objects; categoricalism applies to fundamental particles
• D. Categoricalism requires more fundamental properties than dispositionalism to explain the same phenomena

Answer: (B)

On the dispositionalist view, properties like mass and charge are powers — they are intrinsically 'aimed at' their effects, so laws of nature are expressions of what these powers necessarily do. On the categoricalist view, fundamental properties are purely intrinsic, descriptive states (like geometric shape) with no built-in directedness. Laws are then external constraints — contingent regularities — that bridge categorical properties to effects. This difference has major implications for causation: if properties are powers, causation is necessary; if categorical, causation requires contingent laws to connect cause to effect.

Question 3

A dispositional property like fragility can primarily be said to exist if the object actually manifests the disposition — that is, if it actually shatters.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This confuses a disposition with its manifestation. Fragility is possessed by the glass right now in virtue of its structural properties — the arrangement of molecules, crystal lattice, thickness — regardless of whether it is ever broken. If manifestation were required for possession, a solvent that was never dissolved in anything would have no solubility, which is absurd. The philosophical puzzle of dispositions is precisely that they are real, present properties that point toward merely possible circumstances.

Question 4

Categorical properties can in principle be fully described by examining an object's current state, with no reference to what the object would do in other circumstances.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is what makes categorical properties philosophically straightforward relative to dispositional ones. Being spherical, having a certain mass, having a specific charge distribution — these seem fully characterizable in terms of what the object IS right now, not what it would do. You could give a complete inventory of categorical properties without mentioning any counterfactual situation. Whether this picture is ultimately coherent (categoricalists argue fundamental physics properties like charge are categorical) is a further debate, but the definition is correct.

Question 5

Why do dispositional properties pose a philosophical puzzle that categorical properties do not? What is it about dispositions that makes them ontologically puzzling?

Model answer: Dispositional properties seem to 'reach out' to counterfactual situations — they are defined by what would happen in circumstances that may never occur. This raises two puzzles: (1) What grounds a disposition if the triggering conditions never arise? The glass is fragile even if never broken — but fragility seems to involve a possible shattering. In what sense does an unrealized possibility exist? (2) If dispositions involve modal facts (what would happen), how do they fit into a purely actual, physical world? Categorical properties avoid these puzzles because they are fully characterized by current, actual states with no modal remainder.

The puzzle connects to broader debates about modality and causation. If dispositions are real and irreducible, they seem to require that the world contain not just actual states but modal facts (necessities, possibilities). This is why dispositionalism tends to accompany a realist view about natural necessity and laws. Categoricalism avoids this by treating all fundamental facts as purely actual, but must then explain how contingent laws bridge categorical properties to effects — which introduces its own difficulties about the nature of laws.