According to Hume's regularity theory, when we say 'the collision caused the ball to move,' we are claiming:
AThe collision transferred a causal power or force to the ball, producing the movement with necessity
BEvents of type 'collision with ball' are constantly conjoined with events of type 'ball moving' — nothing more is meant
CThere is a law of nature that metaphysically necessitates the ball's movement given the collision
DThe physical mechanism of momentum transfer is the real causal relation underlying the observed sequence
Hume's regularity theory is deflationary: causation is constant conjunction and nothing more. We never observe necessity, causal powers, or 'causal glue' — only regular sequences of events. Options A and C posit exactly the kind of hidden necessity Hume's theory denies. Option D describes a physical mechanism, which a Humean would analyze as yet another regularity at a finer scale, not as a genuine causal power. The challenge to students is that options A and D feel intuitively true, which is why Hume's view is so philosophically provocative.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
A powers-based (dispositionalist) account of causation differs from Hume's regularity theory by holding that causes genuinely necessitate their effects through intrinsic causal powers, and that regular succession is evidence of those powers rather than the whole story.
AFalse — powers theorists agree with Hume that necessity is projected by the mind, but add that dispositions are real properties
BTrue — this is the core contrast: necessity is in the world itself for powers theorists, while Hume locates necessity only in the mind's habits of expectation
CTrue — but powers theorists hold that only fundamental physical objects have genuine powers, not ordinary objects
DFalse — powers theorists accept regularity theory but argue it is incomplete, not that it is wrong
The core disagreement is precisely about where necessity lives. For Hume, all felt necessity is a habit of mind — we expect the effect after observing repeated conjunctions, and project that expectation onto the world as 'causal necessity.' For powers theorists (Shoemaker, Martin, and others), objects have intrinsic dispositions to produce certain effects, and these powers ground genuine necessity in the world. Regular succession is the observable evidence for those underlying powers, not the complete metaphysical account.
Question 3 True / False
Hume's regularity theory implies that causal necessity is a feature of the world itself, independent of how minds categorize events.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This reverses Hume's actual position. Hume's central argument is that we never observe necessity in the world — only contiguous sequences of events. The feeling of necessity ('the cause must produce the effect') arises from the mind's habitual expectation, formed after repeated observations of the same sequence. On Hume's view, necessity is projected onto the world by the mind; the world itself contains only events in succession, with no additional necessitating connection.
Question 4 True / False
Whether causation involves genuine determination or merely regular succession has no practical consequences — it is a purely abstract philosophical question.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
The stakes are high and concrete. Mental causation — whether beliefs and desires genuinely produce actions — requires that mental states have causal power, not merely correlate with behavior. If causation is only regularity, mental states might be epiphenomenal, with physical states doing the real causal work. Scientific explanation depends on identifying genuine causes, not just regularities: if laws of nature are merely descriptions of regularities rather than expressions of necessity grounded in things' natures, the explanatory status of science changes fundamentally.
Question 5 Short Answer
What is the central dispute between Humean regularity theory and powers-based accounts of causation, and why does it matter for philosophy of mind?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The dispute is about whether causal necessity is in the world or projected by the mind. Hume's regularity theory holds that causation is nothing more than constant conjunction — A causes B means events of type A are regularly followed by events of type B, with no additional metaphysical connection. Powers-based theories hold that objects have intrinsic causal powers that genuinely necessitate their effects, and regular succession is the observable evidence for those powers. For philosophy of mind, this matters because mental causation — how beliefs and desires produce actions — requires mental states to be genuine causes, not mere correlates. On the Humean view, there is a question of whether mental descriptions track any real causal structure or are merely patterns overlaid on physical regularities.
The dispute has been live in philosophy since Hume's Treatise (1739) and remains unresolved. Humean views connect naturally to Humean supervenience in philosophy of science (laws as regularities, not necessities). Powers views connect to essentialism about natural kinds and to robust accounts of scientific explanation as identifying genuine causal mechanisms. The question of mental causation is often used as a test case because the stakes feel most urgent there.