Two doctors each prescribe the same medication in good faith with the same information. One patient recovers; the other has an unforeseeable adverse reaction and dies. Did one doctor act more morally than the other?
AYes — the doctor whose patient died acted less morally because their action caused harm
BNo — both acted with the same intentions and knowledge; the divergence in outcomes is a matter of luck, not moral difference
CYes — the doctor whose patient recovered acted more morally because good consequences validate the choice
DNo — because consequences are irrelevant to the moral evaluation of medical decisions
This is the moral luck puzzle. When we evaluate agents (rather than outcomes), we hold them responsible for the consequences they could reasonably have anticipated — expected consequences — not the actual consequences that luck produced. Both doctors had identical epistemic situations. The difference in outcomes tells us something about the world but nothing different about the doctors. Option A conflates moral evaluation of the agent with evaluation of the outcome; option D goes too far in the other direction by dismissing consequences entirely.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
A driver runs a red light and happens to make it across safely, with no harm done. How should this action be evaluated morally?
AMorally permissible — the actual consequences were fine, and consequences are what matters
BMorally wrong — the expected consequences were bad, and agents are held responsible for what they could reasonably have anticipated
CMorally neutral — the action's status cannot be determined without knowing whether anyone was harmed
DMorally praiseworthy — risk-taking that turns out well demonstrates competence
Running a red light creates a predictable risk of serious harm — the driver could and should have anticipated bad consequences. The fact that no harm actually resulted is luck. Morally evaluating the agent means asking: what consequences could a reasonable person in this situation have anticipated? The answer here is: injury or death to other drivers or pedestrians. Option A is the standard consequentialist error of focusing only on actual outcomes; it would have to excuse reckless behavior whenever it luckily turns out well.
Question 3 True / False
Two people can perform the identical action with identical intentions and knowledge, yet one suffers much worse consequences than the other — a phenomenon that creates pressure to focus moral evaluation on expected rather than actual consequences.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is precisely the moral luck problem. When circumstances (luck, unforeseeable events) cause identical actions to produce wildly different outcomes, basing moral evaluation entirely on actual consequences means judging people for things they couldn't control. Focusing on expected consequences — what the agent could reasonably have anticipated — provides a more coherent basis for moral responsibility and avoids punishing or praising people simply for being unlucky or lucky.
Question 4 True / False
Most ethical theories hold that the moral worth of an action is fully and exclusively determined by its consequences.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Only strict consequentialism (like classical utilitarianism) holds that consequences are the sole determinant of moral worth. Most other ethical frameworks — deontology, virtue ethics, contractualism — accept that consequences are relevant but not exclusively determinative. Even most people's moral intuitions suggest that some actions are wrong even when their consequences are good (a lie that saves a life still involves deception), and some actions are right even when their consequences are bad (keeping a promise to a dying friend at cost to yourself). Consequences are one morally relevant factor among several.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why is the distinction between expected consequences and actual consequences important in moral evaluation? What goes wrong if we ignore it?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Actual consequences are often unknowable in advance and partly determined by chance. Holding agents responsible for actual consequences means judging them for outcomes they couldn't control — moral luck. When evaluating agents rather than outcomes, focusing on expected consequences (what a reasonable person in that situation could have anticipated) is fairer and more coherent. If we ignore this distinction, we end up praising reckless drivers who luckily cause no harm and punishing cautious doctors whose patients unexpectedly die, which severs the connection between moral responsibility and what the agent actually controlled.
The distinction matters practically in law as well as ethics: negligence standards ask whether the defendant could have foreseen the harm, not just whether harm resulted. A doctor who followed best practice is not negligent when a patient unexpectedly dies; a driver who ran a red light is not absolved when they happen not to cause an accident. Moral responsibility tracks what was foreseeable and controllable, not merely what happened.