Questions: Constructivism and Social Construction of Knowledge

Question 1

A student claims: 'Social constructivism just means that sociological factors shape which topics scientists study and whose results get published — not what's actually true.' Which position does this describe?

• A. Strong constructivism — the sociological determination of scientific practice
• B. Weak constructivism — a position most working scientists would accept
• C. Scientific realism — which already acknowledges non-epistemic influences on science
• D. Instrumentalism — which treats theories as tools rather than truths

Answer: (B)

Weak constructivism holds that social factors influence the practice of science — which questions get funded, whose results get published, when controversies get closed — without claiming that the truth or falsity of successful scientific theories is socially determined. Most scientists accept this. Strong constructivism (Bloor's 'strong programme') goes further, claiming that the truth of scientific claims is itself explained by social causes rather than correspondence to mind-independent reality. The student has described the weak version, which stops well short of the strong programme.

Question 2

The self-refutation objection to strong constructivism argues:

• A. Strong constructivism cannot explain why scientific technology works reliably
• B. The sociology of science uses scientific methods, which contradicts the claim that science is socially constructed
• C. If all knowledge is socially constructed, then the constructivist's own claim is socially constructed and cannot claim special authority as an objective truth
• D. Strong constructivism implies that different cultures have incompatible sciences, which is empirically false

Answer: (C)

The self-refutation objection: if the strong programme's thesis — that truth is socially determined — is itself a knowledge claim, it appears to undermine its own authority. Why should we accept it as objectively true if all claims are products of social causation? The constructivist seems to be sawing off the branch she sits on. Option A (the technology objection) is a related but distinct objection, targeting the practical success of science. The self-refutation objection targets the epistemic status of constructivism itself.

Question 3

Strong constructivism holds that the truth or falsity of scientific claims is determined by social factors, not by correspondence to a mind-independent reality.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is the distinguishing claim of the strong programme (associated with David Bloor): that scientific knowledge, including what gets accepted as true or false, is causally explained by social factors — institutional authority, professional norms, power relations — rather than by the world itself. This is the 'relativistic edge' of constructivism. Weak constructivism, by contrast, accepts social influences on practice while allowing that the content of successful theories is constrained by mind-independent reality.

Question 4

Accepting that scientific observation is theory-laden commits one to strong constructivism and the view that science cannot achieve objective knowledge.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

Theory-ladenness — the idea that what scientists observe is shaped by background theories, instruments, and concepts — is now mainstream in philosophy of science and accepted by many scientific realists. It does not entail strong constructivism. Realists can acknowledge that observations are theory-laden while still holding that our best theories are approximately true descriptions of a mind-independent world. Theory-ladenness is a claim about the epistemology of observation; strong constructivism is a much stronger claim about the metaphysics of scientific truth.

Question 5

What is the self-refutation objection to strong constructivism, and how do constructivists typically respond?

Model answer: The objection: if all knowledge is socially constructed, then strong constructivism is itself a socially constructed claim with no special authority to be objectively true — the constructivist appears to undermine her own thesis. Constructivists typically respond by either (1) denying that constructivism is a first-order scientific claim (it's a second-order sociological analysis of science, not itself a scientific theory), or (2) embracing reflexivity — applying constructivist analysis to the sociology of science itself, acknowledging that their own account is situated and contingent rather than claiming god's-eye objectivity.

The reflexive response is philosophically interesting but doesn't fully dissolve the objection: if the constructivist account is itself contingent and socially shaped, why should we find it convincing? Strong constructivism's most important legacy may be the modest insight it shares with weak constructivism — that theory-ladenness and sociological factors genuinely shape scientific practice — rather than the relativistic claim that truth is socially determined.