Mary parks her car in her usual lot before going to work. A colleague asks: 'Does Mary know her car is in the lot?' The same question is asked again while they are searching the lot because her car may have been towed. According to epistemic contextualism, which of the following is correct?
AMary either knows or she doesn't — the question can only have one correct answer regardless of who is asking
BIn both contexts it is false that Mary knows, because she could always be deceived about her car's location
CIn the first context it is true that Mary knows; in the second it is true that she does not — with no contradiction
DWhether Mary knows depends on how confident she feels, not on the conversational context
Contextualism holds that 'knows' tracks different epistemic standards in different conversational contexts. In the ordinary first context, low standards apply and her belief based on parking the car suffices — she knows. In the second context, where the possibility of towing is explicitly salient, standards rise and her unverified belief no longer meets them — she does not know. Both attributions are true because 'knows' means something different in each context. Option A assumes invariantism; option B is the skeptic's position; option D conflates subjective confidence with contextualism's standards.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
What is the most fundamental feature that distinguishes epistemic contextualism from invariantism?
AContextualists deny that knowledge requires justified true belief; invariantists require all three conditions
BContextualists hold that the truth conditions of 'knows' vary with the attributor's context; invariantists hold that 'knows' has fixed truth conditions regardless of context
CContextualists think skeptical arguments are valid; invariantists think they can always be refuted
DContextualists locate knowledge in the community; invariantists locate it in the individual
The defining contextualist thesis is that 'knows' is a context-sensitive expression whose truth conditions shift with the context of the person making the attribution. Invariantism maintains that 'knows' has a single fixed semantic standard — the subject either meets it or doesn't, regardless of who is talking. This disagreement about the semantics of 'knows' is the core dispute. Options A and C do not accurately describe either position; option D mischaracterizes both.
Question 3 True / False
On the contextualist view, whether a person knows something depends on the quality of their evidence and the reliability of their cognitive processes — not on the context of the person making the knowledge attribution.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
That description characterizes the subject's epistemic situation, which is what invariantist views like reliabilism focus on. Contextualism adds that even holding the subject's situation fixed, whether the knowledge attribution is true depends on the attributor's context. The same subject with the same evidence can be correctly said to know in one conversational context and correctly said not to know in another — because the standards embedded in 'knows' vary across contexts. The critical and initially counterintuitive point is that it is the attributor's context, not the subject's, that shifts the standard.
Question 4 True / False
Contextualism can explain why skeptical arguments seem compelling in philosophical discussion but do not undermine our everyday knowledge claims, without concluding that either the skeptic or the ordinary knowledge-claimer is making a mistake.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is the central appeal of contextualism as a response to skepticism. In the philosophy seminar, raising an evil demon possibility raises conversational standards — at those elevated standards, it is genuinely true that you don't know you have hands. In everyday conversation, low standards apply — it is genuinely true that you know you have hands. Both are true in their respective contexts, so there is no contradiction and neither party errs. Contextualism dissolves the skeptical puzzle rather than solving it by refuting the skeptic.
Question 5 Short Answer
In contextualism, what makes 'knows' similar to an indexical expression like 'here' or 'I,' and why does this matter for the skepticism debate?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Like 'here' and 'I,' the word 'knows' in contextualism picks out different things depending on who uses it and in what context. 'I am hungry' is true when said by a hungry person; 'She knows her car is parked outside' is true in a low-standards context but false in a high-standards one. What varies is not the world but the semantic standards the word invokes. For the skepticism debate, this means the skeptic and the ordinary person can both be stating truths — the skeptic operates at elevated standards where ruling out a Cartesian demon is required, while in everyday life those standards don't apply.
The indexical analogy is the core semantic machinery of contextualism. Understanding it reveals why contextualism is a thesis about language — specifically about how the word 'knows' works — rather than a thesis about metaphysics or psychology. It reframes skepticism from 'is knowledge really possible?' to 'what standards does 'knows' invoke in this conversational context?' — a move that many find illuminating and others find evasive.