A policy analyst argues: 'This law is morally legitimate because it maximizes total social welfare.' A contractarian would most likely respond:
AAgreed — maximizing welfare is exactly what rational agents would choose, so this is also contractarian reasoning
BThe law's legitimacy depends on whether rational individuals could accept its terms as a basis for mutual governance — not on whether it maximizes aggregate welfare
CContractarianism is indifferent to social welfare and focuses only on individual natural rights
DContractarianism and consequentialism reach the same conclusions, since both appeal to rationality
Contractarianism and consequentialism are distinct moral frameworks that can diverge sharply. Consequentialism measures legitimacy by outcomes (total welfare). Contractarianism measures it by justifiability to rational agents — specifically, whether the terms could be accepted by all those governed. A policy that maximizes aggregate welfare might still violate the interests of a minority in ways they could not reasonably accept, making it illegitimate by contractarian standards. The question 'would everyone (could everyone) agree?' is categorically different from 'does this produce the best outcome?'
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Rawls's veil of ignorance is designed primarily to ensure that the principles of justice chosen are:
AMaximally beneficial to the worst-off members of society
BFair — not skewed by knowledge of one's own position, talents, or values in the resulting society
CIdentical to what Hobbes argued rational agents would accept from the state of nature
DBased on natural rights that exist independently of any agreement
The veil of ignorance is a device for ensuring impartiality. By stripping agents of knowledge about their particular place in society, their natural endowments, and their conception of the good, Rawls ensures they cannot tailor principles to favor their own position. The resulting agreement is fair precisely because no one knew where they would end up. The specific principles Rawls derives (basic liberties, the difference principle) follow from this setup, but they are conclusions, not the purpose — the purpose is guaranteeing that the agreement process is free from self-serving bias.
Question 3 True / False
Contractarianism and consequentialism can reach different moral conclusions even when both appeal to rationality, because contractarianism requires that principles be justifiable to each individual, while consequentialism can permit sacrificing individual interests for aggregate benefit.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is one of the sharpest distinctions between the two frameworks. Consequentialism aggregates: if harming one person produces enough benefit for many others, the action may be justified. Contractarianism asks whether the individual harmed could reasonably accept the principle licensing that harm — and they typically could not. Scanlon's version makes this explicit: a principle is impermissible if anyone could reasonably reject it, regardless of what aggregate benefits it provides to others. Rationality in contractarianism is individual justifiability, not collective optimization.
Question 4 True / False
Contractarian theories require that participants have actually signed or explicitly agreed to the social contract in order for moral obligations to be binding.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Most contractarian theories, including Hobbes's (in some interpretations), Rawls's, and Scanlon's, rely on hypothetical agreement rather than actual contracts. Rawls's veil of ignorance, for example, is explicitly a thought experiment — no one is actually placed behind it. The agreement is what rational agents *would* choose under appropriate conditions, not what any historical group of people actually signed. Actual-consent versions (closer to Locke) face the problem that almost no one has explicitly consented to their political institutions, so most mature contractarian theories moved to hypothetical or idealized agreement.
Question 5 Short Answer
What distinguishes Rawls's contractarian framework from Hobbes's? Focus on what each treats as the relevant agreement and what motivates the parties to it.
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Hobbes's agreement is motivated by self-interest and fear: rational agents in the miserable 'state of nature' agree to surrender freedoms to a sovereign because it is better than the alternative (war of all against all). The relevant agreement is a practical bargain among self-interested agents seeking security, and the terms reflect whatever the sovereign requires. Rawls's agreement is hypothetical and impartial: rational agents behind the veil of ignorance do not know their position in society, so they cannot bargain for self-interested terms. The motivation is to choose principles that are genuinely fair — that any person in any position could accept. Where Hobbes produces a theory of political stability grounded in rational self-interest, Rawls produces a theory of distributive justice grounded in impartiality.
Both are contractarian in structure — moral and political obligations derive from (a type of) agreement — but they differ fundamentally in what makes the agreement morally authoritative. For Hobbes it is rationality under threat; for Rawls it is rationality under ignorance. Scanlon adds a third variant: what no one could reasonably reject, making the standard interpersonal justification rather than hypothetical choice.