Questions: Dispositional Properties

Question 1

A glass vase sits undisturbed on a shelf for a century, is never struck, and never breaks. Is it fragile?

• A. No — fragility only applies retroactively, after we observe a glass respond to force
• B. No — a property that is never manifested cannot meaningfully be attributed to an object
• C. Yes — fragility is the disposition to break if struck, which the glass possesses regardless of whether it is ever struck
• D. Yes — but only because we can predict it would break based on past experience with similar objects

Answer: (C)

Dispositional properties are possessed right now, independently of whether their triggering conditions ever occur. A glass's fragility consists in its current internal structure (molecular arrangement, crystalline lattice) that would cause it to break under appropriate conditions — not in the fact that it actually breaks. Options A and B represent the misconception that dispositions require manifestation; option D smuggles in an empiricist reduction that misses the metaphysical claim about present possession.

Question 2

A wizard's spell would instantly make a glass invulnerable the moment it is struck, so it never actually breaks. The glass has the internal structure of a fragile object, but the counterfactual 'if struck, it would break' is false due to the wizard. Philosophers use this case to argue that:

• A. Dispositions are never truly possessed unless they can manifest without interference
• B. The simple counterfactual conditional fails as a complete analysis of dispositions — this is the 'finking' problem
• C. Categorical properties are always more fundamental than dispositional ones
• D. Fragility is a folk concept without rigorous philosophical content

Answer: (B)

This is the 'finkish disposition' case: the disposition would be 'finkish' if the triggering conditions cause it to disappear before manifesting. The glass is intrinsically fragile (it has the right structure), but the counterfactual 'if struck, it would break' is false because the wizard would intervene. This shows that fragility cannot simply be identified with that conditional. The finking problem, along with masking cases, reveals that the counterfactual analysis is incomplete as a full account of what it is for something to have a disposition.

Question 3

A dispositional property is primarily real when it is actively manifesting — a glass is mainly fragile in the moment of breaking.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

Dispositional properties are possessed continuously, not only during manifestation. A glass is fragile right now, even if it is sitting safely on a shelf. The disposition consists in the glass's current structural features that would produce breaking under the right conditions. This is the whole point of the counterfactual analysis: 'X is fragile' means 'if X were struck, X would break' — a claim about the present, not just about what happens when struck.

Question 4

Categorical reductionism holds that dispositional properties are fully grounded in — and can be explained by — underlying non-dispositional, categorical properties.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

Categorical reductionism is the view that dispositions are not fundamental: a glass is fragile because of its molecular structure, its crystalline bonding, its internal geometry — all categorical facts about how it currently is. The disposition is real, but it reduces to the categorical base. This contrasts with dispositional essentialism, which holds that at the fundamental level, properties just are dispositions (powers), with no categorical properties underlying them.

Question 5

Explain the 'finking' problem and why it poses a challenge for the simple counterfactual analysis of dispositions.

Model answer: A finkish disposition is one that would disappear at the moment its triggering condition is met. Suppose a glass is fragile but a wizard would make it invulnerable the instant it is struck. The simple counterfactual analysis says: X is fragile iff 'if struck, X would break.' But for the wizard-protected glass, this conditional is false (the wizard prevents breaking), yet we still want to say the glass is intrinsically fragile — it has the right structure. The finking case shows that the conditional can be false for an object that genuinely has the disposition, exposing a gap between having a disposition and the corresponding conditional being true.

The reverse case — masking — also poses problems: a glass might be intrinsically fragile but surrounded by a force field that prevents striking, making 'if struck, it would break' false in a different way. Both cases show that dispositional talk cannot be fully reduced to simple counterfactuals; more sophisticated analyses (using ideal conditions, intrinsic properties, or irreducible power-talk) are needed.