Maria is born with a severe congenital disability limiting her mobility. Carlos, who is fully able-bodied, takes up base jumping and breaks both legs in an accident. Under luck egalitarianism, which person has a stronger claim to redistributive compensation?
ACarlos, because his injury is more severe and creates greater immediate need
BMaria, because her disability results from brute luck — unchosen circumstances — while Carlos voluntarily assumed his risk
CBoth equally, because luck egalitarianism equalizes all disadvantages regardless of their source
DNeither, because luck egalitarianism focuses on equal resources, not compensating disadvantages
Luck egalitarianism draws a fundamental moral distinction between brute luck (unchosen circumstances, like Maria's congenital disability) and option luck (outcomes of deliberate risks, like Carlos's accident). Only brute luck disadvantages generate redistributive claims — it is unfair to be disadvantaged by what you did not choose, but less unfair to bear the costs of risks you freely embraced. This is one of the framework's most controversial implications: proponents distinguish 'harsh' from 'unjust' when it comes to option luck.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Elizabeth Anderson's critique in 'What Is the Point of Equality?' argues that luck egalitarianism fails because:
AIt gives too much to the poor and not enough to compensate the wealthy for their efforts
BIt misidentifies the aim of egalitarianism — real injustice is oppression and social hierarchy, not bad brute luck
CIt is identical to Rawls's difference principle and therefore adds nothing new
DIt overestimates the role of choice and therefore should be replaced with strict welfare equality
Anderson's central objection is that luck egalitarianism has the wrong target. Its logic leads to invasive investigation of whether someone's disadvantage was 'their own fault,' which is demeaning and intrusive. More fundamentally, Anderson argues the real evil egalitarianism should address is oppression — hierarchical social relationships in which people are dominated or treated as inferior. Democratic egalitarianism aims at equal social standing and the ability to participate as equals in social institutions, not equal shares of resources.
Question 3 True / False
Relational (democratic) egalitarianism holds that equal social standing and non-domination can in principle be achieved even when people have unequal material resources.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This distinguishes relational egalitarianism from resource-based or welfare-based theories. What matters morally is the quality of social relationships — whether people interact as equals, without domination or marginalization. Some degree of material inequality may be compatible with equal standing, depending on context and institutions. This contrasts with luck egalitarianism, which focuses on the distribution of resources or welfare.
Question 4 True / False
Luck egalitarianism holds that most inequalities between people are unjust and should be eliminated.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Luck egalitarianism holds that inequalities arising from brute luck (unchosen circumstances) are unjust and should be neutralized — but it explicitly permits inequalities that arise from option luck (deliberate choices and their consequences). If you freely choose to work longer hours or take entrepreneurial risks, the resulting inequalities are not considered unjust under this framework. The theory is designed to make a principled distinction between deserved and undeserved outcomes, not to eliminate all difference.
Question 5 Short Answer
What is the 'equality of what?' question in political philosophy, and why can't we settle it simply by appealing to equality itself?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The 'equality of what?' question asks which dimension of human life should be equalized: welfare (subjective well-being), resources (external goods available), or capabilities (what people are able to do and be). We can't appeal to equality itself because equalizing different dimensions produces different — and sometimes conflicting — distributions. Equalizing resources may leave people with very different capabilities (a bicycle helps a healthy person but not one without legs); equalizing welfare might require compensating people for expensive tastes.
This question, sharpened by Sen and Nussbaum's capabilities approach, reveals that 'equality' is not a single value but a placeholder for a substantive theory about what matters. Each answer generates different policy prescriptions: resource equality supports income redistribution; capabilities equality requires targeted interventions in health, education, and accessibility. The debate over which metric to equalize is where the real action in egalitarian theory lies.