A philosopher argues that 'Sherlock Holmes is a detective' is true — not just pretend-true. Which theory best supports this claim while avoiding commitment to nonexistent concrete objects?
AThe Russellian description theory — the sentence is a true existential claim about actual detectives
BThe abstract object theory — Holmes is a real abstract entity created by authorship, which genuinely has the property of being a detective
CPretense theory — the sentence is literally true because fiction-internal claims count as literal assertions
DDirect reference theory — 'Sherlock Holmes' refers successfully because names always refer
The abstract object theory holds that Conan Doyle created a real abstract entity called Sherlock Holmes, which genuinely (though abstractly) has the property of being-a-detective-according-to-the-stories. This makes the sentence true without requiring a nonexistent concrete person. Option A is wrong — the Russellian view makes the sentence false (no actual person satisfies the descriptions). Option C mischaracterizes pretense theory: pretense theorists say the sentence is fictionally true (true in the pretense), not literally true. Option D fails because direct reference theory cannot handle empty names — without a referent, meaning breaks down.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
What is the fundamental tension that empty names create for direct reference theories of meaning?
ADirect reference theories cannot explain why different names can refer to the same object
BDirect reference theories equate a name's meaning with its referent, so a name without a referent appears to have no meaning — yet sentences with empty names are still understood
CDirect reference theories rely on descriptions, which break down for proper names
DDirect reference theories predict that fictional names refer to the authors who invented them
Direct reference theories (like Millian theories) hold that the semantic content of a name just is its referent. If 'Sherlock Holmes' has no referent, the theory predicts the name is semantically empty — contributing nothing to the proposition. Yet 'Sherlock Holmes was a detective' is clearly understood, apparently meaningful, and seems true in some sense. This is the core puzzle: we need a theory that accounts for the apparent meaningfulness and even truth-aptness of fictional discourse without a real referent. Options A and C describe different problems (co-reference and description theories, respectively). Option D is not a prediction of direct reference theory.
Question 3 True / False
According to Russell's theory applied to fictional discourse, 'Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street' is literally false.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
On Russell's approach, apparent names like 'Sherlock Holmes' are disguised definite descriptions or existential claims. 'Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street' becomes something like 'There exists exactly one person satisfying the Holmes-descriptions, and that person lived at 221B Baker Street.' Since no actual person satisfies the Holmes-descriptions, the sentence is false — not meaningless (it has a truth value), but false. Many philosophers find this counterintuitive because we don't normally treat fiction-internal claims the same way as false empirical claims, but on strict Russellian grounds, that is the result.
Question 4 True / False
Causal-historical theories of reference straightforwardly handle fictional names, because the author's act of naming a character counts as the original 'baptism' that grounds the name's reference.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Causal-historical theories require that a name be connected by a causal chain to an actual object that was 'baptized' at the original naming event. For fictional names, there is no actual object — Conan Doyle did not dub a real person 'Sherlock Holmes.' The act of writing fiction is a deliberate act of reference-failure, not a baptism that connects language to reality. This means causal-historical theories need significant supplementation (or revision) to handle fictional names: either a special category of 'pretend baptism,' appeal to abstract objects as the baptized entity, or some other move. The theory does not straightforwardly apply as-is.
Question 5 Short Answer
Pretense theory elegantly handles most fictional discourse, but struggles with cross-context statements like 'Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective.' Why?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Cross-context statements mix entities from the pretense (Sherlock Holmes) with real-world entities (actual detectives), making it unclear how the pretense framework applies. Within a fiction, 'Holmes is a detective' can be understood as a move in a game of make-believe. But comparing Holmes's fame to that of real people seems to require Holmes to exist in the same domain as those real people — so the statement cannot be merely a move in a pretense governed by the fiction. Pretense theory handles intra-fiction claims well but lacks a clear account of these cross-domain comparisons.
Walton's pretense theory is powerful for fiction-internal claims and for explaining why we can engage emotionally with fiction without being irrational. But the cross-context problem reveals a genuine gap: we talk about fictional characters as if they have properties that can be compared with real things (fame, cultural influence, aesthetic complexity). This pushes toward either the abstract object view (Holmes is a real abstract entity that can genuinely be famous) or a hybrid approach. Most philosophers now acknowledge that no single theory captures all of fictional discourse without remainder.