Questions: Environmental Ethics

Question 1

A logging company proposes to clear-cut an old-growth forest that contains no sentient animals. Which position most clearly condemns this as morally wrong, independently of any harm to sentient creatures?

• A. Shallow ecology (Singer's sentience-based approach), since it extends moral concern beyond humans
• B. Traditional anthropocentrism, since future humans may want the forest for recreation
• C. Deep ecology or land ethics, since these views grant intrinsic value to ecosystems regardless of sentience
• D. Contractualism, since future generations cannot consent to the destruction

Answer: (C)

Shallow ecology only extends moral consideration to sentient creatures — since no sentient animals are present, it does not straightforwardly condemn the clear-cutting on those grounds. Deep ecology holds that all living things (including trees and fungi) have intrinsic value regardless of sentience, and Leopold's land ethic makes the biotic community as a whole the fundamental unit of moral concern. Both views condemn the destruction as intrinsically wrong, not merely as a loss of instrumental value to humans. Contractualism and anthropocentrism may oppose it on other grounds but don't attribute inherent moral standing to the forest itself.

Question 2

What is the key difference between shallow ecology and deep ecology?

• A. Shallow ecology focuses on pollution control; deep ecology focuses on wilderness preservation
• B. Shallow ecology extends moral consideration to sentient animals; deep ecology extends it to all living things and ecosystems regardless of sentience
• C. Shallow ecology is a moderate political movement; deep ecology is a radical one
• D. Shallow ecology is grounded in science; deep ecology is grounded in spirituality

Answer: (B)

The distinction is philosophical, not political or methodological. Shallow ecology (associated with Peter Singer) draws the moral circle at sentience: creatures capable of suffering have moral standing, regardless of species. This extends beyond humans but still excludes non-sentient organisms. Deep ecology (associated with Arne Naess) removes sentience as the criterion entirely: all living things have intrinsic value by virtue of being alive and having their own 'life-project.' This has dramatically different practical implications — for example, deep ecology condemns clear-cutting old-growth forests even when no sentient creatures are harmed.

Question 3

Under Leopold's land ethic, an action can be morally wrong even if it harms no sentient creature, because the morally relevant unit is the integrity of the biotic community.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is the land ethic's central move. Leopold's principle states: 'A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.' The moral unit is the ecosystem as a whole — soils, waters, plants, and animals collectively — not any individual organism's suffering. This means actions like draining a wetland or eliminating a keystone species can be morally wrong even if no individual sentient creature suffers in any obvious way.

Question 4

Granting animals moral consideration means treating them identically to human beings in most moral deliberations.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This is a common misunderstanding that prevents people from engaging seriously with animal ethics arguments. Moral consideration does not mean equal treatment — it means that an entity's interests receive some weight in moral deliberation, not that they receive the same weight as human interests. Singer's own utilitarian framework, for instance, weighs animal suffering against other interests without claiming animals and humans are equivalent. The argument is against the arbitrary exclusion of animal suffering from moral consideration, not for treating a chicken and a human identically.

Question 5

Explain the distinction between intrinsic value and instrumental value, and explain why this distinction is central to debates in environmental ethics.

Model answer: Instrumental value is value as a means to something else — lumber has instrumental value for building houses; a river has instrumental value for fishing. Intrinsic value is value in itself, independent of usefulness to any other entity. Traditional anthropocentrism grants nature only instrumental value: the natural world matters morally only insofar as it benefits humans. Environmental ethics challenges this by arguing that at least some natural entities — sentient animals, all living organisms, or entire ecosystems — have intrinsic value regardless of their utility to humans.

The distinction is central because it determines the scope of the moral community and thus which harms require moral justification. If a forest has only instrumental value, destroying it is wrong only if it harms human (or sentient) interests. If it has intrinsic value, destroying it may be wrong in itself, even if no one is harmed. The debate between shallow ecology, deep ecology, and anthropocentrism is fundamentally a debate about where intrinsic value resides and on what grounds — sentience, life, or ecological function.