Brutus stabs Caesar, and Caesar dies. According to Davidson's coarse-grained theory, how many events occurred?
AThree — the stabbing, the killing, and the death have distinct causal profiles
BTwo — the stabbing and the dying are separate, but killing just redescribes the stabbing
COne — 'the stabbing,' 'the killing,' and 'Caesar's death' are descriptions of a single event
DIt depends on how many properties Caesar exemplified at the moment of death
Davidson's coarse-grained theory individuates events by their causal relations: two descriptions pick out the same event if and only if they share all the same causes and effects. 'Brutus stabbed Caesar' and 'Brutus killed Caesar' refer to the same physical occurrence — one spatio-temporal event that caused Caesar's death. The different descriptions simply characterize the same event under different aspects. Option D describes Kim's view, not Davidson's — Kim individuates by property exemplifications at times.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
On Kim's fine-grained view, 'Caesar's being stabbed by Brutus' and 'Caesar's being killed by Brutus' are:
AThe same event described differently, since they share all causal relations
BTwo distinct events, because they involve Caesar exemplifying different properties
CBoth reducible to a single physical state — the motion of Brutus's arm
DIdentical only if Brutus intended to kill Caesar from the start
Kim defines events as property exemplifications by an object at a time: (object, property, time) triples. 'Being stabbed' and 'being killed' are different properties, so they constitute different events even though they occur at the same time with the same object. This fine-grained individuation multiplies events: a single occurrence can constitute many events depending on how many properties are instantiated. Davidson would say all these descriptions name one event; Kim says each distinct property creates a distinct event.
Question 3 True / False
The debate between Davidson's coarse-grained and Kim's fine-grained event individuation is merely a verbal dispute — both views agree on most substantive metaphysical questions.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This is a substantive debate with real consequences. One critical consequence is for philosophy of mind: if mental events are identical to physical events, Davidson's view allows 'a pain' and 'C-fiber firing' to be the same event (sharing causal relations), making mental-physical identity more readily defensible. On Kim's fine-grained view, they would be distinct events (different properties exemplified), making identity harder. Another consequence: how many causes an effect has differs — Davidson's one-event view yields one proximate cause; Kim's view can yield multiple distinct event-causes.
Question 4 True / False
On Davidson's account, two event-descriptions pick out the same event if and only if they have exactly the same causes and effects.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is Davidson's criterion of event individuation: events are identical when they stand in exactly the same causal relations. 'The stabbing' and 'the killing' of Caesar are the same event because the same prior conditions caused both, and both caused the same subsequent events. Davidson's criterion makes event identity extensional — determined by causal profile — rather than intensional (determined by description or property). This is why it is called 'coarse-grained': many descriptions can name one event, individuated only by its causal position in history.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does the choice between Davidson's coarse-grained and Kim's fine-grained accounts of events matter for philosophy of mind? Give a concrete example of a consequence.
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: One major consequence is for the mind-body identity theory. Davidson's view allows 'a mental event' (a thought) and 'a physical event' (a brain state) to be identical — two descriptions of one event sharing the same causal history. On Kim's view, the mental event (exemplifying 'being a desire for water') and the physical event (exemplifying 'neurons firing in pattern P') would be distinct events because they exemplify different properties, making strict mind-brain identity harder to maintain and raising the causal exclusion problem.
The debate also affects overdetermination: if 'the killing' and 'the stabbing' are one event (Davidson), Caesar's death has one proximate cause. If they are two events (Kim), the death might have two distinct event-causes, raising questions about which one is explanatorily primary. This structure recurs in philosophy of mind: if a mental event and a physical event are distinct (Kim), what does the causal work in producing behavior — the mental or the physical? This is the causal exclusion problem, a central challenge for non-reductive physicalism.