Which of the following best illustrates why determinism is NOT the same as fatalism?
AThe future is fixed by the stars, no matter what I do.
BI decided to take an umbrella and stayed dry — but that decision was itself caused by prior states of the world.
CSince physics determines everything, deliberation is pointless.
DWhatever will be, will be.
Fatalism says outcomes are fixed independently of what you do — your actions are irrelevant. Determinism says outcomes are fixed *through* what you do — your decisions are part of the causal chain. Option B captures this: the outcome (staying dry) depended on the action (taking an umbrella), even though that action was causally determined. Options A, C, and D all express fatalistic resignation, not determinism.
Question 2 True / False
The free will debate is primarily a scientific question about whether the laws of physics are deterministic.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
While the scientific question matters, philosophers widely agree it doesn't settle the debate. Even if quantum mechanics introduces genuine indeterminism, random neural events don't obviously give us the kind of *control* that free will requires — randomness is not freedom. The core question is conceptual: what kind of causation (if any) is compatible with the agency needed for moral responsibility?
Question 3 Short Answer
What is the incompatibilist's central argument that determinism undermines free will?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: If determinism is true, every action is the necessary consequence of the laws of nature and events before our birth. We have no control over the laws of nature or the remote past. Therefore, we have no control over the consequences that flow from them — including our own actions. Because free will requires the ability to have done otherwise, and determinism rules this out, free will is impossible under determinism.
This is van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. It turns on the 'transfer of powerlessness': if you have no power over X, and Y is a necessary consequence of X, then you have no power over Y either. Compatibilists respond by challenging whether 'could have done otherwise' is really required for responsibility — Frankfurt's cases are the key counterexample.