A highly cohesive team of experienced engineers has strong interpersonal bonds and shared identity. They are deciding whether to proceed with a risky product launch. The team lead withholds their opinion until the end, anonymous pre-meeting surveys are used, and a rotating devil's advocate is assigned. Based on Janis's model, this team is:
AHighly likely to exhibit groupthink, because their high cohesion is the primary driver
BUnlikely to exhibit groupthink, because the structural safeguards counteract the risk
CModerately likely to exhibit groupthink, because devil's advocates are not effective in cohesive groups
DCertain to exhibit groupthink, because cohesion combined with high-stakes decisions always produces it
Janis's model explicitly states that high cohesion is necessary but not sufficient for groupthink. The structural conditions — directive leadership, insulation from outside perspectives, and decisional stress — are what convert cohesion into dysfunctional unanimity-seeking. This team has specifically implemented the prescribed structural safeguards (anonymous input, devil's advocate, leader opinion withheld), which counteract each structural risk factor. Option A captures the most common misconception: that cohesion itself is the problem.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
According to Janis's model, which factor alone is sufficient to produce groupthink?
AHigh group cohesion
BTime pressure and decisional stress
CNone — groupthink requires cohesion combined with specific structural conditions
DDirective leadership from an authoritative figure
Janis was explicit: no single factor is sufficient. Cohesion is necessary but not sufficient; directive leadership, insulation, and decisional stress are amplifying conditions, not independent causes. Many highly cohesive groups make excellent decisions; many directive leaders do not produce groupthink. The full syndrome requires cohesion as the foundation plus structural conditions that convert cohesive pressure into unanimity-seeking over critical appraisal.
Question 3 True / False
Highly cohesive groups consistently make worse decisions than less cohesive groups.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This is precisely the misconception Janis's model corrects. Cohesion enables trust, honest communication, and willingness to take intellectual risks — these are assets in decision-making. Groupthink occurs when cohesion combines with structural conditions (directive leadership, insulation, high decisional stress) that suppress critical thinking. With appropriate structural safeguards, highly cohesive groups can make superb decisions. The research evidence for groupthink as originally formulated is also limited to case studies, which cannot control for the many variables distinguishing these groups.
Question 4 True / False
Self-censorship — group members suppressing their own doubts before voicing them — is the key mechanism by which individual private reservations are transformed into apparent group consensus in groupthink.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Self-censorship is the invisible conversion mechanism at the heart of groupthink. No one explicitly orders members to stay silent; the social cost of being the dissenting voice in a unified, cohesive group is simply perceived as too high. The result is that the group's surface consensus masks a collection of private doubts that were never aired. This is why the illusion of unanimity is a groupthink symptom — it reflects social compliance, not genuine agreement. Mindguards reinforce this by filtering out external disconfirming information before it can validate the internal doubters.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does having the group leader share their preferred position early in deliberation promote groupthink, and what specific remedy does Janis prescribe to counteract this?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: When a leader signals a preferred answer early, members read this signal and adjust their expressed views toward it — either through genuine conformity or through calculated compliance. Because the leader controls resources, evaluations, and social standing, deviating from their expressed preference carries implicit costs. Members form their expressed opinions not independently but in relation to the leader's known preference, producing convergence before genuine deliberation has occurred. Janis's remedy is for leaders to explicitly withhold their own opinion during initial deliberation, allowing members to form and express independent judgments first.
This dynamic operates even when members have strong private opinions. The mere knowledge of the leader's position creates a reference point that anchors subsequent discussion. By the time members raise concerns, the group has implicitly converged, and dissent feels like a challenge to the leader rather than a contribution to analysis. The devil's advocate role is most effective when institutionalized — made a rotating, explicit structural role — rather than ad hoc, because it normalizes dissent as a valued contribution rather than a social transgression.