According to Brentano's thesis, what distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena?
AMental phenomena are private and subjective, while physical phenomena are public and objective
BMental phenomena exhibit intentional inexistence — they are directed toward an object, even one that may not exist
CMental phenomena are caused by brain activity, while physical phenomena are caused by external forces
DMental phenomena are always conscious, while physical phenomena are always unconscious
Brentano's thesis holds that intentionality (directedness toward an object) is the defining mark of the mental. I can fear a monster that does not exist, desire an impossible outcome, or remember an event that never happened — the object need not exist for the mental act to be directed toward it. This 'intentional inexistence' (the object existing within the act, not necessarily in reality) distinguishes mental phenomena from physical events, which do not exhibit this directedness.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Husserl's distinction between noesis and noema captures the difference between:
AThe physical object and its mental image
BThe act of consciousness (perceiving, remembering) and the object as it is given in that act
CTrue beliefs and false beliefs about objects
DConscious experience and unconscious mental processing
Noesis is the subjective side — the type of intentional act (perceiving, imagining, judging). Noema is the objective correlate — not the physical object itself, but the object as it appears within that particular act. The same tree can be the noema of a perception (seen from here, in this light), of a memory (recalled as it looked yesterday), or of an imagination (imagined as it might look in autumn). The noesis-noema structure shows that consciousness does not passively receive objects but actively constitutes how they appear.
Question 3 True / False
Intentionality in the phenomenological sense is the same as everyday 'intending' — having a plan or purpose.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Phenomenological intentionality is a technical term for the directedness or 'aboutness' of any conscious act, not just deliberate planning. A sudden fright is intentional in Husserl's sense because it is directed toward something (the threatening object), even though no planning is involved. Every perception, emotion, memory, and fantasy exhibits intentionality. The everyday meaning of 'intention' (having a goal) is only one narrow instance of the broader phenomenological concept.
Question 4 Short Answer
Why is it philosophically significant that I can fear a monster that does not exist? What does this reveal about the nature of intentionality?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: It shows that intentional directedness does not require a real external object — the mind can be directed toward non-existent, fictional, or impossible objects. This means intentionality cannot be reduced to a causal relation between mind and world, since causal relations require both relata to exist. The mind's capacity to intend absent or non-existent objects is central to imagination, planning, fiction, and abstract thought.
This is Brentano's insight about 'intentional inexistence': the object of a mental act exists within the act itself, regardless of whether it exists in the external world. Husserl developed this by analyzing how different intentional modes (perception vs. imagination vs. memory) present their objects with different degrees of 'positing' — perception posits its object as really there, imagination does not. The capacity to intend the non-existent is not a defect of mind but one of its most distinctive and productive features.