What distinguishes an 'international regime' from a formal intergovernmental organization like the United Nations?
AInternational regimes are created only by great powers, while intergovernmental organizations include all states.
BAn international regime is a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which state expectations converge in an issue area, which may or may not be institutionalized in a formal organization.
CInternational regimes are temporary arrangements that dissolve once a specific dispute is resolved.
DRegimes only exist in economic issue areas; security cooperation is handled exclusively by formal organizations.
The regime concept, developed by Stephen Krasner and others, captures a broader phenomenon than formal organizations. The nuclear nonproliferation regime, for example, includes the NPT treaty, the IAEA, norms about weapon-free zones, and informal expectations about acceptable behavior — together constituting a regime even where no single organization oversees all of it. Options A, C, and D describe real features of some regimes but do not capture the general definition.
Question 2 True / False
Because international law lacks a central enforcement authority, states rarely comply with their international legal obligations.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Compliance with international law is actually quite high in most domains. States comply for reputational reasons (a reputation for keeping commitments makes future agreements more credible), reciprocal reasons (violating an obligation invites retaliation), and domestic political reasons (treaty commitments can be enforced by domestic courts and create political costs for defection). The absence of a world police force does not mean the absence of enforcement mechanisms.
Question 3 Short Answer
According to regime theory, how do international institutions help states cooperate even under anarchy — the absence of a world government?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Institutions reduce transaction costs by providing forums for negotiation, reduce uncertainty by monitoring compliance and sharing information, and extend the shadow of the future by linking today's behavior to future cooperation opportunities — making defection less attractive because cheating today costs access to future cooperative gains.
This is the liberal institutionalist answer to realism's skepticism about cooperation. Realists argue that under anarchy, states cannot trust each other and will defect from agreements when it is advantageous. Institutionalists counter that institutions change the incentive structure: they make compliance more visible, cheat more costly, and the horizon of repeated interaction longer — conditions under which cooperation becomes rational even among self-interested states.