Questions: International Justice and Cosmopolitanism

Question 1

A student argues: 'We have special obligations to fellow citizens, just as we have special obligations to family. Neither of these is unjust toward outsiders.' How would a cosmopolitan most directly respond?

• A. The analogy fails because states, unlike families, are held together by coercion rather than genuine bonds of affection
• B. Special obligations to family are also unjust — cosmopolitanism requires completely impartial treatment of all persons everywhere
• C. Special obligations may be legitimate, but they cannot override the fundamental equal moral worth of all persons or justify a global order that consigns billions to poverty purely by accident of birthplace
• D. The comparison is apt — cosmopolitanism supports strong national obligations and imposes no constraints on how states treat non-citizens

Answer: (C)

Cosmopolitanism distinguishes two levels: at the level of fundamental principles, all persons have equal and unconditional moral worth; at the level of special obligations, particular relationships (family, community, nation) can generate additional duties. The cosmopolitan does not deny that we can have special obligations to co-citizens — the question is whether those obligations can justify a global order producing extreme inequality based on the morally arbitrary fact of birthplace. The student's analogy is engaged rather than dismissed; it's subordinated to the fundamental equality claim.

Question 2

Thomas Pogge's argument about global poverty is distinctive among cosmopolitan positions because it claims:

• A. We have stronger obligations to help distant strangers than to help our own citizens, since their need is greater
• B. Global poverty is caused primarily by cultural failures within poor countries, not by international institutions
• C. Affluent nations are not merely failing to help the global poor — they are actively harming them through global economic institutions that enforce unjust arrangements and extract value from poor countries
• D. Global poverty should be addressed through voluntary charitable giving rather than institutional reform

Answer: (C)

Pogge's key move is to reframe global poverty as a harm actively imposed by the global order, not merely a situation where affluent nations fail to help. He argues that global economic institutions — enforcing property rights in resources obtained through historical injustice, structuring trade to benefit wealthy nations, supporting corrupt governments that facilitate resource extraction — actively harm poor populations. This transforms the moral demand from optional charitable generosity to obligatory remedial justice: if affluent nations are causally complicit in global poverty, they owe compensation, not charity.

Question 3

Cosmopolitanism holds that most special obligations to fellow citizens are morally unjustifiable because nationality is a morally arbitrary fact.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This is a common misreading of cosmopolitanism. Most cosmopolitans accept that special relationships — including national ones — generate genuine additional obligations. What they deny is that these special obligations can justify a global order of extreme inequality that tracks birthplace almost entirely. The cosmopolitan claim is not 'no special obligations' but 'fundamental equal worth sets a floor that special obligations cannot undercut.' David Miller's nationalist objections about the legitimacy of national solidarity are taken seriously and engaged rather than dismissed.

Question 4

The cosmopolitan argument for global redistributive justice applies the same reasoning Rawls used to argue for domestic redistribution: morally arbitrary facts about birth circumstances cannot by themselves justify unequal life prospects.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is the core cosmopolitan move, often called 'globalizing Rawls.' Rawls argued that being born into a wealthy family or with advantageous natural talents is morally arbitrary — you did nothing to earn these starting advantages — so institutions must be arranged to benefit the worst-off. Cosmopolitans extend this: being born in a wealthy country is equally morally arbitrary. If we wouldn't accept 'born into poverty' as justification for domestic deprivation, we cannot accept 'born in a poor country' globally. The question is whether any principled reason exists for stopping the argument at national borders.

Question 5

Why does cosmopolitanism treat birthplace as 'morally arbitrary'? Connect this to how Rawlsian reasoning supports domestic redistribution.

Model answer: Rawls argued that morally arbitrary facts — facts you did not earn or deserve — cannot by themselves justify unequal life prospects. Being born into a wealthy family is morally arbitrary: you had no control over it and did nothing to deserve the advantage. Domestic institutions must therefore not merely reflect these accidents; they must be arranged to benefit the least advantaged. Cosmopolitans apply identical logic globally: the country of your birth is equally arbitrary — you did nothing to deserve being born in Switzerland rather than Malawi. If the Rawlsian logic holds domestically, it must hold globally too, unless a principled reason can be given why national borders have moral significance that family accident does not.

The force of the argument comes from its consistency requirement: we already accept that domestic birthplace advantages are morally arbitrary and demand institutional correction. Stopping this argument at national borders requires a principled account of what makes nationality morally relevant in a way that family background is not. Cosmopolitans argue no such account succeeds, generating obligations of global redistributive justice rather than mere charity.