Both 'All copper conducts electricity' and 'All coins in the philosopher's pocket today are dimes' are true universal generalizations. What feature most clearly marks the first as a law of nature and the second as a mere accidental regularity?
AThe first statement has far more instances confirming it than the second
BThe first statement supports counterfactuals — if this wire were copper, it would conduct electricity — while the second does not
CThe first was discovered through controlled experimentation rather than observation
DThe first describes a physical property while the second describes a contingent collection
Both statements cover all their actual instances, so breadth of confirmation alone can't distinguish them. The key test is counterfactual support: genuine laws hold not just for what actually exists but for what would be the case in hypothetical scenarios. 'If this iron rod were copper, it would conduct electricity' is true; 'If this quarter were in the philosopher's pocket, it would be a dime' is false. Laws back counterfactuals; accidental regularities don't. This is the core philosophical criterion both Humeans and necessitarians must explain.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
According to Armstrong's necessitarian view, what makes 'all copper conducts electricity' a law of nature rather than a mere regularity?
AIt appears in the simplest and most powerful systematization of all physical facts
BIt has been confirmed by an extremely large number of independent observations
CThe universal copper-hood stands in a necessitation relation N(F, G) to the universal conductivity
DScientists have reached consensus that it is a fundamental principle of nature
Armstrong's necessitarian account posits that laws are second-order relations between universals. It is not merely that every copper instance happens to be conductive — rather, the property copper-hood necessitates the property conductivity at the level of universals. This necessitation relation N(F, G) is what explains why the regularity holds necessarily rather than accidentally and why it supports counterfactuals. Option A describes Lewis's Best Systems Account (the Humean alternative), not Armstrong's view.
Question 3 True / False
On the Humean view, laws of nature describe regularities in the world but do not govern or necessitate what happens — there is no enforcement mechanism above the regularities themselves.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
True. Humeans about laws — including Lewis's Best Systems Account — hold that the world consists of a mosaic of particular facts, and laws are just the axioms of the best systematization of those facts. They are summaries, not governors. The idea that laws 'make' events happen or 'enforce' regularities adds metaphysical machinery the Humean regards as unnecessary and explanatorily inert. Laws describe what is and was and will be; they do not stand behind events as their cause.
Question 4 True / False
Humeans about laws of nature deny that laws are genuinely explanatory or important to scientific understanding.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
False — this is the most common misconception about the Humean position. Humeans fully accept that laws explain, predict, and unify phenomena; they are central to scientific practice. What Humeans deny is a specific metaphysical claim: that laws have a governing role over and above the regularities they describe. The debate is about what laws are in the furniture of the world, not about whether science successfully discovers them or uses them to explain. Both Humeans and necessitarians agree that laws matter; they disagree about their ultimate metaphysical nature.
Question 5 Short Answer
What is the 'identification problem' for theories of laws of nature, and why does it challenge both Humean and necessitarian accounts?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The identification problem asks: how do we distinguish genuine laws from merely accidental regularities? Both describe true universal generalizations, so the distinction can't come from truth or generality alone. For the Humean (Best Systems Account), the answer is holistic — only by assessing the entire system of facts can you determine which generalizations earn a place in the optimal systematization, making the criterion potentially circular or indeterminate. For the necessitarian, the answer requires identifying which universals stand in the necessitation relation N(F,G) — but there is no clear empirical method for detecting this second-order relation distinct from simply observing the regularity itself.
The identification problem is a live challenge for both camps. Lewis acknowledges that the Best Systems Account may give multiple tied systems, leaving laws underdetermined. Armstrong acknowledges we cannot directly observe nomic necessitation — we infer it from regularities, which risks making the necessitarian account empirically indistinguishable from the Humean one. The problem drives the central literature because any theory of laws must explain both what laws ARE and how we KNOW which regularities are lawful.