A philosopher argues that what we call a 'table' is not a genuine entity over and above the particles that compose it — there are just particles arranged table-wise. This position is a paradigm example of:
ALiberal metaphysics, because it accepts that tables are real objects in the world
BConservative metaphysics — mereological nihilism refuses to posit composite objects beyond what is strictly necessary
CModal realism, because it appeals to possible-world semantics to analyze composition
DNeutral metaphysics, since the philosopher neither posits nor denies tables
Mereological nihilism is the paradigm conservative metaphysical position: it refuses to posit composite objects as genuine entities beyond their parts, citing ontological parsimony. Only simples (fundamental particles) exist; anything else is a description of how simples are arranged. The conservative does not 'deny' tables in the sense of claiming they are illusions — they accept the particles arranged table-wise — but refuses to add a further entity ('the table') to the ontological inventory. Option A is the liberal position; option C misidentifies modal realism's relevance.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
David Lewis's modal realism is described as paradigmatically liberal because:
AIt uses the simplest possible ontology to explain modal claims
BIt posits that possible worlds are concrete realities, generating an ontologically extravagant but theoretically unified account of modal language
CIt relies on Ockham's razor to eliminate unnecessary possible-world entities
DIt restricts ontology to what is strictly required for scientific explanation
Lewis accepted ontological extravagance — infinitely many concrete possible worlds — in exchange for theoretical payoff: a uniform, unified semantics for modal claims ('it's possible that P' means 'there is a world where P is true'). This is the liberal trade-off: complexity of ontology in exchange for simplicity of theory. Conservatives would find Lewis's proliferation of worlds wildly unnecessary; Lewis argued the theoretical payoff justified it. Options C and D describe the conservative approach — parsimony and scientific necessity as the bar — not Lewis's liberal stance.
Question 3 True / False
Conservative metaphysics maintains that parsimony is the primary relevant virtue in ontology, and theoretical payoff is irrelevant to whether an entity should be posited.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Even conservatives recognize that positing entities is justified when they do genuine explanatory work that cannot be done more cheaply. The conservative criterion is not 'parsimony at any cost' but 'no entity should be posited unless it earns its place.' The question is whether the entity does explanatory work that cannot be achieved with a smaller ontology. The liberal and conservative disagree about where to set this bar — not about whether theoretical payoff matters at all. Lewis's modal realism is extravagant, but a conservative would evaluate it by asking whether the payoff genuinely justifies the cost.
Question 4 True / False
Both liberal and conservative metaphysicians accept something like Ockham's razor as a guiding principle; they disagree about how demanding the standard of 'necessity' is.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
The text makes this point explicitly: 'necessity in Ockham's razor is contested.' Both sides accept that you shouldn't posit entities without reason. The conservative sets a demanding bar — an entity must do explanatory work that cannot be done without it. The liberal sets a lower bar — if an entity systematizes our discourse and delivers theoretical payoffs, that's sufficient evidence for admission. The disagreement is about the threshold, not about whether parsimony is a virtue.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does the liberal-conservative divide make disputes about abstract objects or composite entities hard to resolve?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The divide is methodological, not just substantive — the two sides disagree about the standard of evidence required before admitting an entity into one's ontology. Conservatives demand that an entity earn its place by doing explanatory work that cheaper alternatives cannot; liberals accept entities that systematize discourse and deliver theoretical payoffs. Because 'necessity' in Ockham's razor is contested, each side can consistently maintain its position without making an error by its own lights. A conservative can always argue that abstract objects or composites are eliminable through paraphrase; a liberal can always argue that the paraphrase is more costly in theoretical terms. There is no neutral, pre-methodological standpoint from which to adjudicate — the dispute is partly about what counts as good metaphysical practice.
This is the deep point: liberal-conservative disagreements are not just first-order debates (do abstract objects exist?) but meta-level disputes about ontological methodology (what justifies positing something?). Once students understand that the disagreement lives at this methodological level, they can see why neither side is obviously wrong and why the same evidence can be interpreted differently by each. This prepares them for advanced topics like nominalism, modal realism, and mereology.