Kim's exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism faces a serious problem. Which of the following best states that problem?
AMental events cannot be identified with brain events because they have different properties
BIf physical effects have sufficient physical causes and mental causes are distinct from physical causes, mental causation becomes redundant
CNon-reductive physicalists deny that the brain causes behavior
DMental events cause physical events, which then cause further mental events in an endless chain
The exclusion argument runs: (1) every physical event has a sufficient physical cause (causal closure); (2) physical effects are not routinely overdetermined; (3) if mental causes are distinct from physical causes, they are excluded. The non-reductive physicalist wants mental properties to be genuinely causally efficacious while not being reducible to physical properties — but causal closure seems to leave no room for them.
Question 2 True / False
Pointing to brain scans that show neural activity preceding a decision resolves the mental causation problem, because it demonstrates that the mental event caused the physical effect.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Brain scans show that neural activity precedes behavior, but this does not tell us whether that activity is causally relevant *as mental* (i.e., in virtue of its mental character) or only as physical. The mental causation problem is about the causal role of mental *properties*, not merely about whether the brain is involved. Neural data is compatible with epiphenomenalism.
Question 3 Short Answer
Why does the causal closure of the physical domain create a problem for non-reductive physicalism specifically?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Non-reductive physicalism holds that mental properties are real and distinct from physical properties but are not reducible to them. Causal closure says every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause. If the physical causes are sufficient, then additional mental causes are either redundant (epiphenomenalism) or they systematically overdetermine physical effects. Neither option gives mental properties genuine causal work — which is what non-reductive physicalism needs.
The problem is not with physicalism per se but with the 'non-reductive' part. A type identity theorist can say the mental cause just is the physical cause. The non-reductive physicalist must find a way for mental properties to add something causally without duplicating or replacing the physical cause — and this is exactly what the exclusion argument challenges.