Questions: Moral Agency and Personhood

Question 1

An 18-month-old child knocks over a neighbor's expensive vase and breaks it. Why can the child not be held morally responsible?

• A. Because children under two years old lack physical control over their actions
• B. Because legal systems have established 18 months as the minimum age for moral accountability
• C. Because the child cannot recognize moral reasons, deliberate about them, or govern behavior accordingly
• D. Because moral responsibility requires intent, and children never form intentions

Answer: (C)

The philosophical criterion for moral agency is responsiveness to moral reasons — the capacity to recognize that something is wrong, to deliberate about it, and to govern one's behavior accordingly. An infant lacks this capacity, not merely because of age but because of the cognitive and deliberative structures that haven't yet developed. Option D is close but too strong: children do form intentions (they intend to reach for things), but intending an action is different from being responsive to moral reasons about whether the action is permissible.

Question 2

A chimpanzee enforces social norms within its group — ostracizing members who violate sharing expectations. What does this complicate about standard accounts of moral agency?

• A. Nothing — animal behavior is purely instinctual and irrelevant to philosophical analysis of agency
• B. It suggests moral agency may require social behavior rather than individual deliberation
• C. It challenges the idea that responsiveness to norms is a uniquely human capacity, blurring the boundary between agents and non-agents
• D. It proves that chimpanzees are full moral agents equivalent to adult humans

Answer: (C)

If responsiveness to reasons is the criterion, and chimpanzees appear to respond to social norm violations and adjust behavior accordingly, the line between 'genuine' moral responsiveness and sophisticated social behavior becomes harder to draw. This doesn't prove chimpanzees are full moral agents — but it does suggest that the paradigm case of deliberating adult human may be a point on a continuum rather than a qualitatively distinct category. This is precisely the kind of edge case the topic invites you to reason through carefully.

Question 3

An entity can be a moral patient — something we can wrong — without being a moral agent capable of bearing responsibility.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

True. Moral agency and moral patiency are distinct categories that can come apart. An infant cannot deliberate or respond to moral reasons (not a moral agent), but can clearly be harmed and has interests we are required to protect (a moral patient). A rock is neither. Adult humans paradigmatically combine both. The distinction matters because it clarifies who can be held responsible and to whom we owe duties — these are separate questions answered by separate criteria.

Question 4

Any entity that can experience suffering automatically qualifies as a moral agent.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

False. The capacity to suffer is the criterion for moral patiency — for being the kind of entity that can be wronged. Moral agency requires a different and additional capacity: responsiveness to moral reasons, the ability to deliberate, form intentions, and govern behavior accordingly. An animal that suffers may be a moral patient deserving protection, but that doesn't make it a moral agent capable of being held responsible. Conflating the two categories produces confusion about both who bears responsibility and who deserves moral consideration.

Question 5

What is the core capacity that distinguishes a moral agent from a merely sentient being, and why does this distinction matter for how we think about AI systems?

Model answer: The core capacity is responsiveness to moral reasons: a moral agent can recognize that something is wrong, deliberate about it, and govern its behavior on that basis — not just react to stimuli or optimize for outcomes. A sentient being can experience pleasure and pain but may not be able to respond to moral reasons as such. For AI systems, the distinction matters because if an AI merely mimics the outputs of deliberation without genuine intention formation or reason-responsiveness, it cannot bear moral responsibility for its actions. If it does satisfy the capacity conditions, questions about responsibility and even moral consideration become live — which is why careful analysis of what agency requires precedes any conclusions about AI ethics.

This question targets the intersection of abstract philosophical analysis and contemporary practical stakes. The answer requires distinguishing the capacity (reason-responsiveness) from mere behavioral mimicry, which is exactly the contested question for both AI and for edge cases like animals and cognitively disabled individuals.