The Euthyphro dilemma asks: is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is already good? Why does this pose a problem for divine command theory?
AIt proves that God does not exist and therefore cannot ground moral authority
BIf good = whatever God commands, morality becomes arbitrary (God could have made cruelty obligatory); if God commands what is already good, then goodness is independent of His commands — either way, divine command theory fails to explain the source of moral authority
CIt shows that natural law theory is the only coherent alternative
DIt proves that moral authority can only come from social contracts, not divine sources
The dilemma's force is that it forecloses both options for the divine command theorist. Horn one (good = commanded) makes morality arbitrary — God's commands would be the explanation for goodness, but then God could have commanded anything and that would be 'good.' Horn two (commanded = already good) admits that goodness exists independently of God's will, which means divine commands are tracking a moral reality they didn't create — undermining the claim that God's will is the source of moral authority.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
A person asks: 'I know cheating is wrong, but why am I genuinely obligated not to do it if I can get away with it without punishment?' This question is primarily about:
AThe definition of the word 'wrong' in moral language
BThe content of morality — specifically which actions are prohibited
CThe source and authority of moral obligations — what makes them binding even when unenforced
DWhether different ethical frameworks agree on the wrongness of cheating
This question separates content (what we ought to do) from authority (why we are genuinely bound to do it). The person already grants that cheating is 'wrong' — they're asking why that wrongness creates a real obligation on them in the absence of external enforcement. This is the question of moral authority, and answering it requires choosing among sources: rational requirements, social agreements, inherent value of persons, divine command, and so on.
Question 3 True / False
A moral obligation is mainly genuinely binding if there is an external authority or threat of punishment that enforces it.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This confuses moral authority with legal or social enforcement. Many moral obligations (e.g., keeping a promise to someone who cannot punish you for breaking it) are considered binding even without enforcement. The whole point of investigating moral authority is to ask whether obligations can bind intrinsically — through the nature of reason, personhood, or the moral facts themselves — rather than requiring an external enforcer.
Question 4 True / False
Determining the source of moral authority (why moral claims bind us at all) is a separate question from determining the content of morality (which specific actions are right or wrong).
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
These are genuinely distinct questions. You could agree with a consequentialist about what actions maximize welfare while disagreeing entirely about why welfare considerations create binding obligations. Conversely, a divine command theorist and a Kantian might agree on many specific moral rules (don't lie, don't murder) while offering completely different accounts of what makes those rules authoritative. Keeping the questions separate prevents confusing 'what should I do?' with 'why should I do anything at all?'
Question 5 Short Answer
Explain the Euthyphro dilemma and why it poses a problem for divine command theory as a justification for moral authority.
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The Euthyphro dilemma asks: is something morally good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is morally good? If the former, morality is arbitrary — God could have commanded cruelty and it would be 'good,' which seems wrong. If the latter, then goodness is independent of God's will; moral facts exist that God is tracking, and those facts, not God's commands, are the ultimate source of moral authority. Either way, divine command theory fails to provide a non-circular grounding for moral obligations.
The dilemma is a fork in the road with no good exit for the divine command theorist. It shows that simply appealing to God's will doesn't settle where goodness comes from — it either makes goodness arbitrary (which undermines it) or presupposes a moral standard God didn't create (which makes His commands derivative, not foundational). This is why many religious ethicists have moved toward natural law theory or other frameworks that don't reduce moral goodness entirely to divine will.