Questions: Moral Constructivism

Question 1

A constructivist is asked whether slavery was morally wrong in a society where it was widely accepted. Which response best reflects the constructivist position?

• A. Yes — moral facts exist independently of any society, and slavery violated them
• B. No — slavery was accepted there, so it was morally permissible within that context
• C. Yes — slavery would not be endorsed by ideally rational, impartially situated agents, so it was wrong regardless of what that society believed
• D. We cannot say — constructivism holds that moral claims express attitudes, not facts

Answer: (C)

Constructivism grounds moral truth in what ideally rational agents would endorse under ideal conditions (impartiality, full reflection, universalizability) — not in what any actual community happens to believe. This gives constructivism critical purchase over actual practices: if those practices would not survive the constructive procedure (e.g., Rawls' veil of ignorance), they are wrong, regardless of social acceptance. Option A describes moral realism. Option B is moral relativism. Option D is expressivism.

Question 2

An expressivist says 'Torture is wrong' expresses an attitude of disapproval but is neither true nor false. How would a constructivist respond?

• A. The expressivist is correct — moral language is attitude-expression all the way down
• B. Moral claims are true or false, but their truth is constructed through rational procedures rather than discovered from mind-independent facts
• C. Moral claims are false, because there are no moral facts of any kind
• D. Moral claims are straightforwardly true or false based on natural facts about wellbeing

Answer: (B)

Constructivism holds that moral claims are truth-apt — they can be genuinely correct or incorrect — which is what separates it from expressivism. But unlike moral realism, this truth isn't grounded in mind-independent moral facts. It is grounded in what agents would endorse under ideal rational conditions (consistency, impartiality, universalizability). Option C describes error theory. Option D describes naturalistic moral realism. The constructivist position threads between 'just attitudes' and 'external facts.'

Question 3

Moral constructivism holds that a community's actual moral beliefs determine what is morally true within that community.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This is moral relativism, not constructivism. Constructivism grounds moral truth in what ideally rational agents would endorse under ideal conditions — not in what any particular community actually believes. The constructive procedure (e.g., deliberating behind a veil of ignorance, applying universalizable principles) is more demanding than sociological description. This is why constructivism can criticize a community's practices even from within its own framework: if those practices fail the ideal rational test, they are wrong regardless of current belief.

Question 4

Moral constructivism preserves the idea that moral claims can be genuinely true or false, unlike expressivism.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is one of constructivism's defining features and what makes it more than a version of expressivism. Expressivists hold that moral claims express attitudes and are not truth-apt. Error theorists hold they are truth-apt but systematically false. Constructivists hold that moral claims are truth-apt — they can be genuinely correct or incorrect — but that their truth is constructed through rational procedures, not discovered from mind-independent moral facts. Moral reasoning is real reasoning, not just persuasion or emoting.

Question 5

How does moral constructivism differ from both moral realism and moral relativism?

Model answer: Against moral realism, constructivism denies that moral facts exist independently of minds and rational procedures — morality is answerable to human reason and circumstances, not to a non-natural moral realm. Against moral relativism, constructivism insists that moral truth is not simply whatever a community happens to believe — the constructive procedure (what ideally rational, impartially situated agents would endorse) provides a standard that actual practices can be judged against and found wanting. The middle position: moral facts are constructed (not discovered), but constructed through a demanding rational process (not arbitrary preference).

This threading between realism and relativism is the central philosophical achievement constructivism claims for itself. It keeps moral reasoning from collapsing into either metaphysical extravagance (mysterious non-natural facts) or normative emptiness (anything goes as long as someone endorses it). The challenge every constructivist must meet is specifying the constructive procedure with enough determinacy to yield real moral conclusions without smuggling in prior moral commitments as hidden premises.