Sophie is forced to choose which of her two children will be sent to die. She chooses one, the other survives, and she is consumed by guilt for the rest of her life despite knowing she had no other option. According to the pro tanto view of obligations, her persistent guilt:
AIs irrational, since she fulfilled her strongest obligation and the weaker obligation was fully dissolved by the choice
BIs appropriate moral residue — evidence that the obligation to the other child was real and persists as an unmet demand even after the best available action was taken
CProves she made the wrong choice and should have refused to choose at all
DIs a natural psychological reaction but philosophically irrelevant since only all-things-considered obligations count
On the pro tanto view, genuine moral obligations can be real without being absolute. Both obligations — to each child — were genuine, and choosing one does not erase the other. The guilt is not irrational; it is what Bernard Williams called moral residue: the appropriate response to having violated a real obligation, even a justified violation. Option A describes the Kantian/consequentialist view (all-things-considered obligations dissolve the competing requirement). Option D conflates the psychological response with philosophical irrelevance — the pro tanto view holds that residue is philosophically significant evidence.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
A Kantian philosopher argues that a correct moral theory cannot generate genuine moral dilemmas. The strongest version of this argument is:
AMoral dilemmas are rare and therefore not philosophically important enough to challenge a correct theory
BIf obligations are all-things-considered judgments, then after weighing all factors exactly one action is obligatory — apparent conflicts dissolve into difficult calculations, not genuine contradictions
CGenuine dilemmas are real but Kant's specific theory handles them through the categorical imperative
DMoral residue after a difficult decision proves that one obligation outweighed the other, confirming a single correct answer
The key Kantian/consequentialist move is to argue that moral obligations are all-things-considered: after all relevant factors are weighed, only one action can be obligatory. What looks like 'two conflicting obligations' is really 'one obligation that outweighs another consideration.' The 'dilemma' becomes a difficult calculation with a determinate answer, not a genuine logical contradiction. Option C misrepresents Kant; Option D conflates residue with evidence for a single correct answer, which the pro tanto theorist would dispute.
Question 3 True / False
A moral dilemma, properly understood, is any situation in which an agent faces a difficult decision involving strong competing desires or values.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
A genuine moral dilemma requires conflicting moral *obligations* — binding requirements that cannot both be fulfilled — not merely competing desires or values. A difficult career choice between two attractive options is not a moral dilemma. A Sophie's choice situation, where whatever you do you violate a real moral duty, is. The distinction between 'hard decision' and 'genuine dilemma' is precisely what makes the philosophical problem interesting: most hard decisions are just difficult calculations, not situations involving irresolvable obligation conflict.
Question 4 True / False
On the pro tanto view, if an agent correctly identifies the stronger obligation and acts on it, the weaker obligation persists as a genuine moral demand — meaning the agent owes something (acknowledgment, apology, compensation) to those harmed by the overridden choice.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is one of the practical implications the pro tanto view draws from the concept of moral residue. If the overridden obligation was real, not merely a consideration that evaporated, then the agent has genuinely wronged — even justifiably — the person on the losing side. This generates obligations of acknowledgment and, where possible, repair. In policy contexts (triage, resource allocation, eminent domain), this means institutions cannot simply calculate the correct answer and move on; they owe something to those who bear the costs of decisions made for the greater good.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does the concept of moral residue — the guilt, regret, or felt obligation to make amends that persists after choosing correctly in a dilemma — matter for the philosophical debate about whether genuine moral dilemmas are possible?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Moral residue is the primary empirical evidence that genuine dilemmas exist. If the competing obligation simply dissolved when overridden (as the all-things-considered view holds), there would be no rational basis for guilt after making the right choice — the residue would be mere psychological noise. The pro tanto theorist argues instead that residue is the rational response to having violated a real obligation: even when a violation is justified, the original obligation persists, and the agent is appropriately responsive to it. Whether residue is evidence of a genuine violated obligation or only of sensitivity to costs is the crux of the debate between views.
The debate is ultimately about the structure of moral reality: are obligations binary (either you have one or you don't, and it determines what you must do), or are they real but defeasible (genuine yet overridable, with traces that survive the override)? Moral residue is a phenomenological datum — something that needs explaining — and each view gives a different explanation. The explanation you accept has large practical consequences for how we respond to people harmed by necessary decisions.