Two people disagree about capital punishment. Person A thinks it deters crime; Person B thinks it does not. Both agree that if it doesn't deter crime, it should be abolished. What type of disagreement is this primarily?
AValue disagreement — they prioritize different moral principles about punishment and justice
BConceptual disagreement — they define 'deterrence' or 'punishment' differently
CEmpirical disagreement — they disagree about a factual question (whether capital punishment actually deters crime) that evidence could in principle resolve
DThis is not a moral disagreement at all since it rests entirely on a factual matter
When two people share the same moral principle but disagree about the facts relevant to applying it, the disagreement is primarily empirical. Both accept the conditional 'if it doesn't deter, abolish it' — the only dispute is about the empirical premise. This is the most tractable type: resolving the factual question should, in principle, resolve the moral one. Identifying this structure tells us to look at evidence, not at competing values.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Two ethicists agree on all relevant facts about economic inequality and agree on what 'justice' means, yet still persistently disagree about redistribution policy. What type of disagreement most likely explains this?
AEmpirical disagreement — they must still be reading different economic data
BConceptual disagreement — they must mean different things by 'fairness' or 'equality'
CValue disagreement — they have different fundamental commitments about whether individual liberty or collective equality should take priority
DThis disagreement is impossible if two people genuinely share both the facts and the concepts
When facts and concepts are shared but disagreement persists, we have reached genuine value disagreement: a difference in fundamental moral orientations. One person may hold individual liberty as the supreme political value; another may hold equality or community first. These commitments are not derivable from facts or definitions — they reflect deep orientations about what matters. This is the hardest type to resolve through argument alone, but it can still be examined for consistency and internal coherence.
Question 3 True / False
Persistent moral disagreement among thoughtful, well-informed people proves that morality is merely a matter of subjective opinion.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Disagreement is evidence of difficulty, not evidence of groundlessness. Scientists persistently disagree about contested empirical questions without that proving science is merely subjective. Moral realists specifically hold that moral facts can exist even where we disagree about them. Moreover, much moral disagreement turns out to be empirical or conceptual — the value bedrock may be more widely shared than surface disagreements suggest.
Question 4 True / False
Resolving an empirical disagreement that underlies a moral dispute will generally be sufficient to bring the parties to full moral agreement.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Empirical resolution removes one layer of disagreement but may not reach deeper layers. For example, two people might agree that capital punishment does not deter crime, yet one might still support it on retributive grounds — the idea that wrongdoers deserve punishment regardless of deterrence. That is now a value disagreement that the factual resolution cannot touch. Empirical resolution is sometimes necessary and often narrows the dispute, but underlying conceptual or value differences can persist.
Question 5 Short Answer
Describe the three types of moral disagreement and explain why identifying which type is present matters for how you try to resolve a dispute.
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Empirical: people share values and concepts but disagree on relevant facts — examine evidence. Conceptual: people use the same moral terms but mean different things — clarify definitions. Value: people agree on facts and concepts but prioritize different fundamental commitments (liberty vs. equality) — harder to resolve by argument, but can be examined for consistency and implications. Identifying the type matters because each requires a different resolution strategy.
The three-type framework is a diagnostic tool. When moral conversations stall, asking 'are we disagreeing about facts, concepts, or underlying values?' often reveals where to focus. Two people who believe they have a deep values clash may actually only disagree about an empirical fact; resolving that fact can dissolve the apparent moral conflict. Conversely, two people who seem to be disputing facts may be masking a deeper value conflict that no amount of factual evidence can settle.