Questions: Moral Nihilism

Question 1

A student says 'moral nihilism and expressivism are basically the same — both reject objective moral truth.' What is wrong with this claim?

• A. Expressivism actually accepts objective moral facts; it just thinks they are constructed rather than discovered
• B. Nihilism holds that moral claims genuinely fail — they make truth-apt assertions that turn out false — while expressivism says moral claims serve a non-truth-apt function (expressing attitudes) and so cannot fail in that way
• C. Both positions are identical in their diagnosis but differ only in their practical recommendations
• D. Moral nihilism is simply the more extreme end of the expressivist spectrum

Answer: (B)

The distinction turns on truth-aptness. Expressivists say moral claims are not in the business of making truth-apt assertions — 'murder is wrong' expresses an attitude, not a belief that could be true or false. Since it doesn't purport to describe a fact, it cannot fail to describe one. Nihilism takes the opposite view: moral claims do purport to be objectively and bindingly true — and that is precisely why they fail. The presupposed moral facts don't exist, so the claims are systematically false or gappy. This is why nihilism refuses the expressivist 'repair': changing what moral language does doesn't address the nihilist's concern about what moral language claims to do.

Question 2

A moral nihilist who continues to use moral language in everyday life ('that was wrong,' 'you ought to keep your promise') is most likely employing which strategy?

• A. Self-contradiction — nihilism logically requires abandoning all moral language immediately
• B. Expressivism — using moral language to express attitudes while denying moral facts
• C. Moral fictionalism — using moral language as a useful fiction without literal belief in what it asserts
• D. Constructivism — treating moral norms as constructed agreements that have pragmatic validity

Answer: (C)

Moral fictionalism holds that we can continue using moral language as useful fiction — speaking of rights and obligations as if they existed, for practical coordination purposes, while not literally believing the underlying metaphysical claims. This is different from expressivism (which denies the claims are truth-apt in the first place) and from constructivism (which holds that moral truths are genuinely constructed). The nihilist-turned-fictionalist acknowledges the error while finding practical value in the fiction — similar to how we speak of 'the average person' knowing no such individual exists.

Question 3

According to moral nihilism, both the claim 'murder is wrong' and the claim 'murder is permissible' fail to be true, since there are no objective moral facts for either to correspond to.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is the nihilist's key move and what makes it distinctive from mere immoralism. The nihilist doesn't argue that murder is permissible — that would be accepting the moral framework and disagreeing within it. Instead, nihilism denies that any moral claim succeeds, because the presupposed objective moral facts don't exist. Both 'murder is wrong' and 'murder is permissible' make claims that cannot be satisfied. Moral language is, for the nihilist, systematically like asserting that the present king of France is bald — there is no referent to make it true.

Question 4

Moral nihilism is less radical than error theory because it accepts that some moral claims can be repaired through social construction.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

Moral nihilism is the position that follows from accepting error theory and rejecting any constructivist repair. Error theory (Mackie's canonical version) diagnoses moral claims as false because they presuppose objective, prescriptively binding facts that don't exist. The nihilist agrees with this diagnosis AND refuses the constructivist move — the claim that moral truths can be 'constructed' through rational agreement or social practice. Constructivism is precisely the pragmatic repair that nihilism rejects. If anything, nihilism and error theory are tightly aligned; it is constructivism that softens the anti-realist position.

Question 5

What does moral nihilism's 'refusal of pragmatic repair' mean, and why does this distinguish it from both expressivism and constructivism?

Model answer: Pragmatic repair refers to the moves other anti-realists make to salvage moral language after denying objective moral facts: expressivists say moral claims serve a different (non-truth-apt) function — expressing attitudes and coordinating behavior — so they don't fail; constructivists say moral truths are built from what rational agents would agree to, so they're 'real enough.' The nihilist refuses both: moral claims purport to be objectively and bindingly true, and if they fail at that — because no such facts exist — no functional substitute or rational construction saves them. Changing what moral language does (expressivism) or generating moral truths procedurally (constructivism) doesn't address the nihilist's core complaint, which is about what moral language claims to do.

This refusal is what gives nihilism its radical character. Expressivism and constructivism are 'deflationary' positions that try to keep the practical value of moral discourse while abandoning metaphysical realism. Nihilism insists the metaphysical failure is fatal — that moral discourse cannot be rehabilitated without either changing what it claims (which would make it something other than morality) or discovering the objective facts it presupposes (which nihilism denies exist).