Questions: Moral Psychology

Question 1

Researchers find that people's disgust responses reliably predict moral condemnation of 'harmless but disgusting' acts (e.g., consensual sibling incest with no consequences). Haidt interprets this as support for the social intuitionist model. Does this finding show that such condemnations are unjustified?

• A. Yes — if a judgment originates in disgust rather than principled reasoning, it is automatically unreliable and should be revised
• B. No — the causal origin of a belief in emotional processes does not by itself determine whether the belief is correct or epistemically justified
• C. Yes — empirical findings about moral psychology directly reveal which moral judgments are accurate
• D. No — but only because disgust is a reliable guide to moral harm whenever it occurs

Answer: (B)

This is the genetic fallacy applied to moral psychology: the causal history of a belief does not automatically determine its justificatory status. A belief caused by disgust could still be correct, and disgust can be reliable in domains it's calibrated to (e.g., avoiding pathogens). The debunking worry becomes compelling when two additional conditions hold: (1) the intuition is in tension with other intuitions or careful reasoning, and (2) the causal mechanism clearly wasn't tracking moral truth in this domain. Disgust applied to harmless acts satisfies both — but the mere fact that disgust caused the judgment is not sufficient alone to debunk it.

Question 2

In Greene's trolley-problem research, most people say they would pull a lever to divert a trolley (killing one, saving five) but would not push a large person off a bridge (same arithmetic outcome). Greene's explanation is:

• A. People correctly apply a valid deontological distinction between killing by action and killing as a side-effect of redirection
• B. Physical contact triggers an emotional alarm system, generating a strong 'don't do it' response that feels different despite identical utilitarian math
• C. People are poorly informed about the consequences of the bridge case and would agree if better explained
• D. The cases differ morally because pushing involves more certainty about the victim's death

Answer: (B)

Greene's dual-process account explains the asymmetry through the emotional salience of physical contact. The footbridge case — pushing someone — activates an alarm system in the brain (associated with personal force and direct harm) that generates a strong deontological intuition against pushing. The switch case lacks this visceral trigger. Since the utilitarian math is identical, Greene argues the moral difference in intuitive responses reflects different cognitive processes (System 1 emotional vs. System 2 deliberative), not a genuine moral distinction. This challenges deontological theories that treat the distinction as principled.

Question 3

Haidt's social intuitionist model claims that moral reasoning typically precedes and produces moral judgment, with emotions serving mainly as post-hoc motivational support.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

Haidt argues precisely the opposite: moral judgment is primary (fast, automatic, and emotionally driven), while moral reasoning is typically post-hoc rationalization — constructing arguments after the judgment has already been made. This inverts the rationalist picture (Kohlberg's stages) in which careful reasoning produces the judgment. Haidt's model draws on dual-process psychology: moral intuitions operate like System 1 perception, and the 'reasoning' we produce to justify them is typically motivated rationalization, not the true cause of the verdict.

Question 4

Demonstrating that a moral intuition has an evolutionary or emotional causal explanation is sufficient by itself to show that the intuition is unreliable and should be revised.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This confuses causal explanation with epistemic debunking. Many reliable beliefs have evolutionary or emotional causes. The debunking argument requires showing not just that the belief has a non-rational cause, but that the causal mechanism was not tracking moral truth — that it was calibrated to something else (reproductive fitness, pathogen avoidance, in-group signaling) rather than moral facts. The combination of a non-truth-tracking mechanism AND conflict with careful reasoning or other intuitions gives specific grounds to revise. A blanket dismissal of emotionally-caused moral beliefs would eliminate much of our moral knowledge.

Question 5

What is the 'debunking problem' in moral psychology, and under what conditions does it give genuine reason to revise a moral intuition?

Model answer: The debunking problem asks whether explaining the causal origin of a moral belief — in evolution, emotional responses, or social conditioning — undermines its epistemic justification. The answer is not automatic: a belief can have an emotional cause and still be correct, since emotions can reliably track morally relevant features of situations. The debunking argument gains force under two conditions: first, the causal mechanism that produced the intuition was not tracking moral truth (e.g., disgust evolved to avoid pathogens, not to detect moral wrongness); and second, the intuition conflicts with other intuitions or with careful reasoning. When both conditions hold together — a non-truth-tracking mechanism and internal tension — there are specific grounds to revise the intuition rather than trust it. In the absence of conflict, even an emotionally-caused intuition may be trustworthy.

Haidt's framework is descriptive — it explains how moral judgments are formed — but it does not directly answer the normative question of which intuitions we should trust. Moral psychology supplies the tools for that decision: by identifying the causal mechanism behind an intuition, we can assess whether it's the kind of mechanism likely to be calibrated to moral reality. Disgust applied to consensual harmless acts is a paradigm case where the mechanism (pathogen avoidance) is clearly miscalibrated. Empathic responses to suffering may be more reliably calibrated. The debunking problem thus points toward a nuanced reflective equilibrium, not blanket skepticism or blanket trust.