A consequentialist principle concludes that we should harvest one unwilling person's organs to save five dying patients. A moral philosopher who treats this conclusion as evidence against the principle — rather than accepting it — is applying which reasoning strategy?
AInconsistency — they are applying the principle differently to different cases
BPrincipled revision — using a monstrous case-verdict as a data point that constrains the theory
CEmotional bias — privileging gut feeling over rational argument
DCircular reasoning — using a conclusion to disprove its own premise
Moral intuitions about cases carry evidential weight, not just emotional weight. When a principle yields a conclusion that virtually everyone finds monstrous, that widespread intuition is evidence that the principle is wrong or needs qualification. This is the method of reflective equilibrium: neither principles nor case-judgments automatically dominate; when they conflict sharply, either can be revised. Treating this as 'emotional bias' (Option C) misunderstands the epistemological status of strong moral intuitions — they are data points, not mere feelings.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Achieving 'reflective equilibrium' in moral reasoning means:
ASelecting one ethical theory and applying it consistently to all cases
BReaching a state where general principles and judgments about specific cases mutually support each other
CEliminating subjective intuitions so that reasoning can be purely rational
DResolving all moral disagreements through democratic consensus
Reflective equilibrium is a state of coherence between principles and case-judgments — neither systematically overriding the other. You revise principles when they yield unacceptable case-verdicts; you revise case-judgments when a principle reveals them to be inconsistent or based on morally irrelevant factors. Option A describes dogmatic application of a single framework, which is precisely what reflective equilibrium resists by treating both principles and intuitions as revisable.
Question 3 True / False
Strong, persistent moral intuitions about specific cases carry evidential weight in ethical reasoning — they are not mere emotional reactions to be dismissed whenever they conflict with a principle.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Moral intuitions — especially those that are widely shared, stable under reflection, and survive careful scrutiny — are treated as data points in moral epistemology. If a valid-seeming argument leads to a monstrous conclusion, the right response may be to reject a premise rather than accept the conclusion. Intuitions are fallible and can be revised (moral progress has sometimes required this), but they are not automatically inferior to abstract principles.
Question 4 True / False
Effective moral reasoning requires choosing a single ethical method and applying it consistently — mixing consequentialist, deontological, and case-based approaches leads to incoherence.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
The core claim of this topic is the opposite: no single method dominates, and effective moral reasoning integrates multiple approaches as mutual checks. Consequentialist calculation, principle-based reasoning, case intuitions, and coherence testing each illuminate different aspects of a moral situation. Pure single-method application is precisely what generates the monstrous conclusions (like the organ harvesting case) that motivate the multi-method approach.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why do moral philosophers treat strong, widely-shared intuitions about specific cases as 'data points' rather than as mere subjective feelings? What role do they play in evaluating ethical theories?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Strong moral intuitions — especially those stable under reflection and shared across cultures — represent accumulated moral knowledge embedded in our considered responses to concrete situations. They serve as evidence that can confirm or disconfirm ethical theories, just as experimental data confirms or disconfirms scientific theories. If a theory yields an obviously unacceptable verdict in a realistic case, that is evidence the theory is flawed or needs refinement — not merely that we feel uncomfortable. This gives intuitions an epistemological status beyond mere preference.
The analogy to science is apt: a theory that predicts anomalous observations faces pressure to revise itself. Moral theories that generate clearly unacceptable verdicts face the same pressure. This doesn't make intuitions infallible — moral progress has often required revising them — but it means they carry real evidential weight that cannot simply be dismissed by pointing to the logical validity of an argument.