Questions: Moral Universalism

Question 1

A moral relativist argues: 'Different cultures have different moral practices — some permit practices others condemn. Therefore, there are no universal moral truths.' What is the standard universalist response?

• A. Most cultures actually agree on the same core moral practices, so the premise is false
• B. Variation in moral practice across cultures is compatible with a single underlying moral truth — just as variation in medical practice across cultures doesn't imply there are no universal medical truths
• C. Cultures that permit immoral practices simply haven't developed far enough morally
• D. The argument commits the naturalistic fallacy by deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'

Answer: (B)

The universalist's key move is denying the inference from 'variation in practice' to 'no universal truth.' Diverse medical practices across cultures (herbal remedies, bloodletting, surgery) don't prove there are no medical truths — they may mean some practices are wrong. Similarly, diverse moral practices may reflect errors, different circumstances, or moral ignorance rather than proof of relativism. Universal truth can coexist with the empirical fact of diverse practices.

Question 2

A philosopher claims only that torturing children for pleasure is wrong universally, regardless of culture or historical period. This position is best described as:

• A. Strong universalism, since it claims a specific moral truth
• B. Weak universalism, since it claims only that at least one universal moral principle exists
• C. Moral relativism, since it acknowledges only one principle is universal rather than all
• D. Moral nihilism, since it cannot prove this principle is grounded in anything objective

Answer: (B)

Weak universalism holds that there is at least one universal moral principle — as opposed to strong universalism, which claims many determinate principles are universal. This philosopher is paradigmatically weak universalist: she's not claiming comprehensive moral knowledge, only that this one principle is not culturally relative. Weak universalism is a minimal defense against relativism and is much harder to deny than the strong version.

Question 3

Moral universalism is a normative ethical theory — it tells us specifically which actions are right or wrong.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

False. Moral universalism is a metaethical position — it makes a claim about the nature of moral truths (that some hold universally) rather than specifying which particular actions are right or wrong. A universalist could be Kantian, utilitarian, or a natural law theorist, each with different normative commitments. What they share is the metaethical claim that their favored principles hold universally, not merely within particular cultures.

Question 4

Accepting moral universalism commits you to the view that we currently know most or most universal moral truths.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

False. Universalism is a claim about the existence and nature of moral truths, not about how much of that truth we currently know. A universalist can be epistemically humble: there are universal moral truths, and we are still in the process of discovering them — just as there are universal truths about the physical world not yet discovered. The history of moral progress (recognizing that slavery is wrong) is itself a universalist narrative: we came to recognize something that was always true.

Question 5

How can the universalist acknowledge real cross-cultural moral differences while still maintaining that some moral principles are universally true?

Model answer: The universalist distinguishes between moral practice (what people actually do and believe) and moral truth (what is actually right or wrong). Diverse moral practices across cultures may reflect errors, ignorance, or different circumstances — not proof that morality is purely relative. Just as variation in medical practice across cultures doesn't disprove universal medical truths, variation in moral practice doesn't disprove universal moral truth. Cross-cultural diversity is evidence about what people believe, not about what is objectively true.

This move — distinguishing descriptive claims from normative claims — is central to metaethics. The relativist's argument treats the sociological fact of disagreement as philosophical proof of relativism. The universalist denies this inference: disagreement about facts doesn't show there are no facts, in ethics any more than in science. Moral inquiry, like scientific inquiry, can make genuine progress toward truth even when that truth is contested and difficult to know.