Questions: Physicalism About Mind

Question 1

Which version of physicalism holds that every individual mental event is identical to some physical brain event, but mental types (e.g., 'pain') need not correspond to a single physical type?

• A. Type identity theory
• B. Token physicalism
• C. Eliminative materialism
• D. Supervenience physicalism

Answer: (B)

Token physicalism says each particular mental event (this pain I feel now) is identical to a particular physical event (this firing of C-fibers now), but 'pain in general' need not be reducible to one physical type — because pain might be realized differently in humans, octopuses, and robots. This contrasts with type identity theory, which does require mental types to map onto physical types.

Question 2

Accepting physicalism means the hard problem of consciousness is solved, because once we accept that mental states are physical, there is hardly anything left to explain.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

Physicalism relocates the explanatory burden but does not dissolve it. Even granting that mental states are physical, the hard problem asks why those physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience (qualia) at all. This explanatory gap — why there is 'something it is like' to be in a mental state — persists within physicalism and is precisely what makes it 'hard.'

Question 3

What is the multiple realizability objection to type identity theory, and which version of physicalism was developed partly in response to it?

Model answer: Multiple realizability: pain (or any mental state) can be physically realized in very different ways across species and systems, so 'pain' cannot be identical to a single physical type like C-fiber firing. Token physicalism and functionalism were developed in response, allowing mental types to be multiply realized while preserving a physicalist commitment.

Type identity theory requires each mental type to correspond to exactly one physical type. But if an octopus feels pain through a completely different neural mechanism than a human, and a hypothetical silicon robot could also feel pain, then 'pain' cannot be identical to any single physical property. This argument, associated with Hilary Putnam, pushed physicalists toward weaker identity claims or functional characterizations of mental states.