Questions: Political Authority and Legitimacy

Question 1

What is the distinction between 'de facto' authority and 'de jure' authority?

• A. De facto authority is held by elected officials; de jure authority is held by appointed officials
• B. De facto authority is legal authority recognized in statute; de jure authority is customary authority recognized by tradition
• C. De facto authority is the actual power to compel compliance; de jure authority is the moral right to rule and thereby generate genuine obligations
• D. De facto authority requires majority consent; de jure authority requires unanimous consent

Answer: (C)

A gang with enough weapons has de facto authority — people comply because they have to. A legitimate government has de jure authority — people have a moral obligation to comply because the state has a right to rule. The key distinction is between power and moral right. Most of political philosophy concerns de jure authority: not what states can get people to do, but what states are morally entitled to demand.

Question 2

A state can be politically legitimate — possessing morally justified authority — even if some of its laws and policies are unjust.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

Legitimacy and justice are distinct dimensions of political evaluation. Legitimacy concerns whether a state has the right to rule and whether its authority generates genuine obligations. Justice concerns whether its laws and policies are morally correct. A democratic state with broadly fair procedures may be legitimate even while enacting unjust policies. Conversely, a state that enacted perfectly just laws by illegitimate means (e.g., coup) might be just but lack legitimacy.

Question 3

Consent-based accounts of political legitimacy hold that authority is justified by the consent of the governed. Why do most actual states fail to meet this standard straightforwardly, and how have consent theorists responded?

Model answer: Few citizens have actually, explicitly consented to be governed. Consent theorists respond by invoking tacit consent (staying in the country implies consent), hypothetical consent (you would consent under ideal conditions), or fair-play accounts (accepting benefits generates obligations equivalent to consent). Each response faces objections: tacit consent is not real consent; hypothetical consent is not actual consent.

The consent standard, taken literally, would delegitimize virtually every existing state. Locke appealed to tacit consent via continued residence, but critics argue that most people lack a genuine exit option. Rawls shifted from consent to a natural duty to support just institutions, which does not require consent at all. The ongoing debate about whether consent is necessary, sufficient, or merely relevant to legitimacy remains one of the most active in political philosophy.