A philosopher argues that Maria — born and raised in a country, educated in its schools, and using its roads daily — has tacitly consented to its laws simply by choosing to remain. What is the strongest objection to this reasoning?
ATacit consent is invalid because consent must always be expressed in a formal written document
BMaria's 'choice' to remain is not genuinely voluntary if emigrating requires abandoning family, career, and community, so the analogy to actual contractual consent fails
CTacit consent theory would obligate Maria only to laws she personally benefits from, not to all laws equally
DThe social contract requires hypothetical consent, not actual consent, so tacit consent is the wrong framework
The classic objection to tacit consent is that it collapses voluntariness: staying in a country where you were born, grew up, and have deep ties is not the kind of free choice that gives contracts their moral force. If leaving requires enormous sacrifice — family separation, career loss, language barriers — 'choosing' to stay is at best constrained compliance, not genuine consent. Stretching 'consent' to cover this case drains the concept of its normative content: it can no longer distinguish morally obligated from merely coerced compliance. The consent framing appears to justify obligation but does so by abandoning what made consent morally significant in the first place.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
A wealthy citizen benefits enormously from public institutions (security, courts, markets). A poor citizen in the same state faces discriminatory policing, inadequate public services, and unequal legal treatment. According to fair play theory, do both have equally strong political obligations?
AYes — both live under the same state and receive some public goods, generating equal obligations
BFair play theory struggles here: unequal benefit distribution weakens the fairness argument for equal burden-sharing
CNeither has genuine obligation because the state is not perfectly just
DFair play theory is silent on this case — it only applies to explicit cooperative agreements
Fair play grounds obligation in not being a free rider: you enjoy the benefits of cooperation, so fairness demands you bear the burdens. But if benefits are distributed very unequally — if one citizen receives security, justice, and opportunity while another faces discriminatory policing and diminished access to services — the claim that fairness demands equal burden-sharing loses force. The theory faces a genuine internal challenge: it is hard to argue that someone receiving far fewer benefits owes the same contribution as someone who benefits extensively. This is a structural vulnerability of fair play accounts, distinct from the consent problem.
Question 3 True / False
According to natural duty theories of political obligation, the strength of a citizen's duty to obey the law depends on how just the laws and institutions are.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Natural duty approaches (like Rawls's) ground obligation in a moral duty to support institutions that satisfy the demands of justice. Unlike consent or fair play, this duty doesn't require voluntary action — it applies generally to anyone in relation to sufficiently just institutions. Crucially, the duty weakens as institutions become less just: you have reduced (or no) obligation to comply with manifestly unjust laws, which coheres with the intuition that civil disobedience can sometimes be justified. The justice of the institution is directly load-bearing in generating or diminishing the obligation.
Question 4 True / False
Political obligation and political legitimacy refer to the same concept — a state that exercises political power thereby generates political obligation in its citizens.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
Political power (the capacity to enforce compliance through coercion) and political obligation (the moral duty to obey) are distinct and can come apart. A dictatorial state may have the power to compel behavior without having any legitimate authority that generates genuine moral obligations. Even a recognized legitimate state may generate obligation for some citizens but not others — e.g., those denied meaningful participation. Legitimacy concerns whether the state has a right to rule; obligation concerns whether citizens have a corresponding duty. The two are conceptually separable: power without obligation is tyranny; one can even theorize about obligation without full legitimacy.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does consent theory face a dilemma in grounding political obligation — either too few people are obligated, or the concept of consent is stretched until it loses its normative force?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Interpreted strictly (only explicit, voluntary consent counts), almost no one in modern states has genuinely consented — citizenship is typically inherited at birth, not chosen. The theory then implies almost no one has political obligation, which seems far too revisionary. To rescue the theory, philosophers expand to tacit consent — residing in the territory, using public goods, accepting benefits — but this progressively weakens the voluntariness condition that made consent morally binding in the first place. A person born into a country with no realistic exit option is not 'consenting' in any sense comparable to signing a contract. The theory must choose: strict consent (few obligated) or broad consent (the concept does no normative work).
This dilemma explains why later theorists turned to alternative foundations — fair play and natural duty — that don't depend on voluntary agreement. Each alternative avoids the consent problem but faces its own characteristic difficulty, suggesting that no single theory fully captures political obligation's sources.