A warlord controls a territory through credible threats of violence. His commands are consistently obeyed. Does he have legitimate authority over the territory?
AYes — authority just means having the consistent ability to secure compliance
BYes — consistent compliance demonstrates de facto authority, which is sufficient for legitimate authority
CNo — the warlord has power (capacity to compel) but not legitimate authority (a normative right to demand obedience that creates genuine obligation)
DIt depends on whether his commands happen to align with just outcomes
Authority and power are different in kind, not just degree. The warlord secures compliance through fear of consequences — a purely causal relationship. Legitimate authority makes a normative claim: it claims the *right* to compliance and creates an obligation that gives subjects reasons to obey beyond fear. Consistent compliance proves the warlord has power; it says nothing about whether he has authority. Option 0 and 1 commit the error of reducing authority to a behavioral fact about compliance rather than a normative fact about rightful demands.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Joseph Raz's service conception holds that an authority is legitimate when following its directives helps subjects better conform to reasons they already have. Under this view, should you follow an authority whose commands are systematically mistaken about your reasons?
AYes — authority's legitimacy comes from its institutional role, not from the accuracy of its commands
BNo — on Raz's view, if the authority fails to help you conform to your own reasons better than you could do on your own, it lacks the justification for legitimate authority
CYes — complying with authority creates new reasons independently of pre-existing ones, binding regardless of accuracy
DNo — Raz's account is consent-based, so authority that you haven't explicitly accepted lacks legitimacy
The service conception makes legitimate authority instrumental to the subjects' own reasons. An authority is legitimate when following it produces better conformity with reasons you already have (facts about your wellbeing, morality, etc.) than you would achieve by deciding for yourself. This is the 'normal justification thesis.' An authority that systematically gives bad advice about your reasons fails this test — it is no longer serving you — and therefore loses its claim to legitimacy on Raz's account. Option 3 misidentifies Raz's view with consent theory.
Question 3 True / False
Having sufficient power to enforce compliance is sufficient for legitimate political authority.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This is the central confusion the concept of legitimate authority is designed to prevent. Power is the capacity to make things happen through coercion or influence — it is a causal notion. Legitimate authority is a normative notion: it claims the right to demand compliance and creates genuine obligations on subjects. A bank robber has power; a judge has authority. The distinction matters because if power and authority were identical, we could not criticize authoritarian regimes as lacking authority — they'd have it by definition. Legitimate authority requires principled justification, not just effective enforcement.
Question 4 True / False
On natural duty accounts of political authority, citizens are obligated to support just institutions regardless of whether they have personally consented to them.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Natural duty accounts (associated with Rawls and others) ground political obligation not in personal consent or agreement but in a general duty to support and comply with just institutions that exist in one's society. This contrasts with consent theories, which struggle to explain political obligation for people who have never explicitly consented — most citizens. Natural duty accounts say consent is irrelevant: the obligation derives from the justice of the institution and the general duty to promote justice.
Question 5 Short Answer
What distinguishes authority from mere power, and why does this distinction matter morally?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Power is the capacity to produce compliance through force, incentives, or coercion — a purely causal relationship. Legitimate authority makes a normative claim: it claims the right to demand compliance and, correlatively, creates a genuine obligation on the part of subjects — a reason to obey that goes beyond mere fear of consequences. The robber and the police officer both can compel behavior, but only the officer has authority. The distinction matters morally because it determines whether non-compliance is merely risky (facing a robber) or genuinely wrongful (flouting a legitimate law). It also explains what is distinctively wrong with authoritarian regimes: not that they use coercion (all states do) but that they demand obedience without the principled grounds — consent, service to subjects' reasons, natural duty — that could make the demand legitimate.
This is why political philosophy cannot simply describe who has effective control; it must assess whether that control generates genuine normative claims. Domination (arbitrary, unconstrained power) generates no obligations — only prudential compliance. Legitimate authority generates obligations that bind even when you disagree with specific commands.