A public health budget can fund either Program A (gives 10 welfare units to a person at baseline well-being of 80) or Program B (gives 8 welfare units to a person at baseline well-being of 20). A utilitarian picks A. A prioritarian picks B. Why?
AThe prioritarian thinks equality has intrinsic value, so reducing the gap between rich and poor is always preferred
BThe prioritarian assigns greater moral weight to benefits received at lower levels of well-being, making the weighted value of 8 units to the worse-off person exceed the weighted value of 10 units to the better-off person
CThe prioritarian follows Rawls's maximin rule and always benefits the worst-off person regardless of magnitude
DThe prioritarian believes well-off people do not deserve welfare improvements
Prioritarianism weights welfare improvements by a factor that increases as the recipient's baseline well-being decreases. Because the person at well-being level 20 is much worse off than the person at level 80, the same quantum of benefit counts for more morally. The 8 units to the worse-off person, once weighted, outweigh the 10 units to the better-off person. This is NOT because equality has intrinsic value (that's egalitarianism) or because we must benefit the worst-off exclusively (that's maximin). It is because absolute position determines moral weight.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
How does prioritarianism differ from Rawls's difference principle (maximin)?
APrioritarianism ignores the worst-off group; maximin focuses exclusively on it
BPrioritarianism gives extra moral weight to all worse-off people (with weight increasing at lower levels); maximin focuses exclusively on improving the position of the worst-off group
CPrioritarianism is concerned with relative inequality; maximin is concerned with absolute levels of welfare
DThey are equivalent — both instruct us to maximize the welfare of the least well-off
Rawls's maximin principle focuses entirely on the worst-off group: inequalities are just only if they benefit those at the bottom. Prioritarianism gives extra weight to benefits to all worse-off people, with weight smoothly increasing as well-being decreases. A benefit to the second-poorest matters more than a benefit to someone in the middle, even if the absolute worst-off is unaffected. Prioritarianism is sensitive to the entire distribution weighted by absolute level, not just its minimum.
Question 3 True / False
Prioritarianism holds that equality has intrinsic moral value — a perfectly equal distribution is generally preferable to an unequal one, even if the equal distribution leaves everyone worse off.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This describes strict egalitarianism, not prioritarianism. Prioritarianism explicitly rejects intrinsic concern with equality. Parfit's leveling-down objection exposes the problem: pure egalitarianism seems to endorse making everyone equally miserable rather than allowing an unequal but Pareto-superior distribution. Prioritarianism avoids this by focusing on absolute well-being levels rather than the gap between people — it cares about how badly off someone is, not how much worse off they are than others.
Question 4 True / False
In prioritarianism, what makes a benefit more morally weighty is the recipient's absolute level of well-being — not how much worse off they are relative to others.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is a crucial distinction from egalitarianism. Egalitarians care about relative position — the gap between people. Prioritarians care about absolute position — how badly off someone is in absolute terms. If a person has very low well-being, benefits to them carry extra moral weight regardless of whether others are similarly or more badly off. Prioritarianism focuses on absolute suffering, not relative inequality, which is why it can recommend distributions that increase inequality while remaining defensible.
Question 5 Short Answer
What is the leveling-down objection to egalitarianism, and how does prioritarianism respond to it?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The leveling-down objection: pure egalitarianism implies that an equal distribution where everyone has 5 welfare units is morally superior to an unequal distribution where one person has 10 and another has 8 — even though in the equal distribution the better-off person has been made worse off and no one has gained. Egalitarianism seems to endorse this because equality has intrinsic value. Prioritarianism responds by denying that equality has intrinsic value: it cares only about absolute levels of well-being, so making someone worse off is never an improvement — there is no benefit to leveling down.
Parfit used this objection to distinguish genuine concern for the badly-off (captured by prioritarianism) from mere concern for equality (which he thought was confused). A prioritarian world with slight inequality but higher absolute well-being for all is unambiguously better than a perfectly equal world where everyone is worse off. This makes prioritarianism more defensible than strict egalitarianism while still capturing the intuition that improving the lives of the worst-off matters more than equivalent improvements for the well-off.