Questions: Reference Determination: How Words Hook onto the World

Question 1

According to the causal-historical theory of reference, if it turns out that a man named Schmidt actually proved the incompleteness theorems and Gödel merely stole the proof, then our uses of 'Gödel' refer to:

• A. Schmidt, because 'Gödel' picks out whoever actually proved the incompleteness theorems
• B. No one, because the name's descriptive content fails to fit any real person
• C. Gödel, because reference tracks the causal chain back to the original naming, not descriptive fit
• D. Both men equally, since the reference is ambiguous

Answer: (C)

On the causal-historical theory (Kripke), reference is fixed by a causal chain tracing back to the original dubbing event, not by whatever descriptions speakers associate with the name. Most people associate 'Gödel' with 'proved the incompleteness theorems' — but if that description fits Schmidt, not Gödel, the causal theory says we're still talking about Gödel. The name hooks onto the man who was originally called 'Gödel,' regardless of whether our beliefs about him are correct. This is exactly the kind of case that shows why the description theory fails: it would wrongly predict we're talking about Schmidt.

Question 2

Putnam's semantic externalism argues that what 'water' refers to is determined by:

• A. The descriptions and beliefs speakers associate with the word 'water'
• B. Social conventions established by linguistic communities over time
• C. The real nature of the stuff in the environment, even when speakers don't know its chemical structure
• D. The intentions of the original speaker who introduced the term

Answer: (C)

Putnam's externalism holds that 'water' refers to H₂O even among speakers who had no idea water was H₂O. Reference is partly determined by the environment — by what is actually there — not solely by internal mental content. Before chemistry, people used 'water' to refer to H₂O without knowing it. The reference was already fixed by the nature of the substance in the world. This is why Putnam says 'meanings ain't in the head': what a word picks out can depend on facts outside the speaker's mind.

Question 3

On the description theory of reference, if everyone who uses the name 'Aristotle' associates it only with 'the teacher of Alexander,' then it is necessarily true that Aristotle taught Alexander.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

True — and this is precisely Kripke's devastating objection to the description theory. If 'Aristotle' just *means* 'the teacher of Alexander,' then by definition, Aristotle taught Alexander — it's analytically true, hence necessarily true. But intuitively, Aristotle *might* never have met Alexander; it's a contingent historical fact. The description theory generates a false necessity by conflating the reference-fixing description with the meaning of the name. This shows that names cannot simply mean their associated descriptions.

Question 4

Semantic externalism implies that two speakers with identical internal mental states could mean different things by the same word.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

True, and this is Putnam's 'Twin Earth' thought experiment. Imagine a planet exactly like Earth where the substance that fills rivers, falls as rain, and is called 'water' has a different chemical structure (XYZ instead of H₂O). A person on Twin Earth and their mental duplicate on Earth have identical internal states, but their uses of 'water' refer to different substances — H₂O vs. XYZ. This shows that reference is determined at least partly by the environment, not solely by what is in the speaker's head. Meaning is not purely internal.

Question 5

Why does the causal-historical theory say reference is stable even when speakers hold false beliefs about the referent?

Model answer: Because on the causal-historical theory, what determines reference is the chain of communication tracing back to an original naming event, not the accuracy of speakers' subsequent descriptions. Each speaker inherits their use from prior speakers, who inherited it from others, all the way back to whoever first introduced the name for the object. Even if beliefs associated with the name are wrong, the referential chain remains anchored to the original object.

This is the deepest advantage of the causal-historical view over description theories. Reference doesn't require descriptive knowledge of the referent — it requires only participation in a communicative tradition that links back to an original grounding. This explains how ordinary people can refer to 'gold' or 'Aristotle' even if their beliefs about gold's chemistry or Aristotle's biography are largely mistaken. The chain does the referential work; speakers need not know the exact nature of what they're talking about.