A core theoretical disagreement in IR concerns whether states care about absolute gains (how much better off they are in absolute terms) or relative gains (how much better off they are compared to other states). Liberals expect states to cooperate if both gain absolutely, even if one gains more. Realists worry states will defect if a rival gains relatively more, enabling the rival to dominate. This disagreement explains why liberals expect more cooperation and realists expect more conflict.
Model trade scenarios: would Country A join a trade bloc if it gains 5% GDP growth but Country B gains 7%? Liberals say yes; realists say maybe not, fearing B's relative advantage in military spending.
Realists do not oppose all cooperation—they expect states to cooperate on matters where relative gains are irrelevant or mutual losses from non-cooperation are severe.
You already understand the basic realist-liberal divide from your study of structural realism and liberalism in IR. Realists emphasize anarchy, power, and security; liberals emphasize interdependence, institutions, and mutual benefit. The relative versus absolute gains debate is where this theoretical disagreement has its sharpest empirical teeth — it determines whether states will join cooperative arrangements even when those arrangements benefit them.
The setup is straightforward. Imagine two states, A and B, considering whether to join a free trade agreement. Economic analysis shows that both states gain from trade: A grows 3%, B grows 5%. In absolute terms, both are richer after the agreement. A liberal analysis says: A should join. It is better off absolutely. Trade creates more resources for everyone; the fact that B gains more is irrelevant to A's welfare calculation. Cooperation serves absolute interests.
A realist analysis introduces a complication: what does B do with its extra 2%? In an anarchic system with no enforcement authority, relative power matters because any state could eventually threaten you. If B's larger gains translate into a military spending advantage — better weapons, larger army, more geopolitical leverage — then A may be worse off in power terms even while being richer in economic terms. Realists argue that states under anarchy cannot afford to think only about their absolute position; they must always monitor their position *relative to potential adversaries*. This is the logic that makes states hesitant to cooperate even when cooperation is mutually beneficial: the fear that the partner gains relatively more is a structural incentive to defect.
The debate has empirical stakes. If realists are right, international economic cooperation should be perpetually fragile — states should constantly defect from trade agreements, alliances, and arms control treaties whenever partners gain relatively more. If liberals are right, robust cooperation should be achievable wherever absolute gains exist, and institutions like the WTO or EU should be stable once established. The historical record is mixed. Liberals point to the remarkable depth of post-WWII economic cooperation among wealthy democracies. Realists point out that this cooperation occurred among allies who shared a common external threat (the Soviet Union) — relative gains vis-à-vis adversaries were largely suspended within the alliance. The debate dissolves somewhat once you condition on the context: relative gains worries are most acute in security competition and among great power rivals. Among stable allies with no realistic threat of conflict, the realist mechanism loses much of its bite — which is why liberals expect cooperation to be durable within the Western order while realists remain skeptical about great power cooperation across adversarial divides.
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