You are at a car lot and can plainly see a red car. You claim to know it's red. A philosopher then explicitly raises the possibility that you are color-blind and merely believe it to be red. According to the relevant alternatives theory, what has happened to your knowledge claim?
ANothing — your epistemic position is unchanged, so your knowledge is unchanged
BYour knowledge is undermined because you cannot conclusively rule out color-blindness
CThe conversational context has shifted, making a once-irrelevant alternative relevant, so the claim 'I know it's red' is now harder to assert in this context
DThe relevant alternatives theory cannot apply here because color-blindness is empirically checkable
The relevant alternatives theory holds that 'knows' is context-sensitive. In normal car-lot conversation, color-blindness is not a relevant alternative — it is too remote from any practical purpose to need exclusion. But once the philosopher explicitly raises it, it becomes salient within that conversational context. The standard for knowledge has risen. Crucially, nothing about your actual evidence or cognitive state changed — only the contextual rules for what counts as 'ruling out enough.' This is why option A is wrong: your epistemic position is the same, but the conversational standard shifted around you.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Which of the following best captures the relevant alternatives theory's response to the brain-in-a-vat skeptical argument?
AWe can actually rule out the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis using introspection
BKnowledge only requires ruling out relevant alternatives; the brain-in-a-vat scenario is not relevant in ordinary contexts
CSkeptical hypotheses show that ordinary knowledge claims are all false
DThe brain-in-a-vat scenario is logically incoherent, so it cannot threaten knowledge
The relevant alternatives theory does not dispute that we cannot rule out the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis — it concedes that point to the skeptic. Instead, it attacks the assumption that knowing p requires ruling out ALL alternatives, however remote. In everyday contexts, extreme skeptical scenarios are not relevant alternatives: they are too detached from any practical or conversational purpose to count against ordinary knowledge claims. The theory only becomes vulnerable to the skeptic when a philosopher explicitly raises the hypothesis, thereby shifting context and making it relevant. Option A misunderstands the theory, and option D would be a different kind of anti-skeptical argument.
Question 3 True / False
According to the relevant alternatives theory, a sentence like 'S knows that p' can be true in one conversation and false in another without any change in S's evidence or cognitive state.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
This is exactly what epistemic contextualism (the broader view the relevant alternatives theory supports) claims. The standards embedded in 'knows' are context-sensitive — when conversational stakes or salience of alternatives change, so does whether a knowledge attribution is true. A scientist in a lab talking about ordinary observations has a lower standard than a philosopher's seminar where skeptical hypotheses are on the table. S's evidence hasn't changed; the context-relative standard has. This parallels how 'tall' can be true of the same person in one context (tall for a jockey) and false in another (not tall for a basketball player), with no change in the person.
Question 4 True / False
The relevant alternatives theory implies that everyday knowledge claims are seldom genuinely true, since skeptical possibilities can typically be raised.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This misreads the theory in the direction of skepticism. The whole point of the relevant alternatives approach is to vindicate ordinary knowledge claims by noting that skeptical possibilities are not relevant in ordinary contexts. In a typical conversation — discussing whether there's a barn, whether it rained yesterday, whether the keys are on the table — extreme skeptical hypotheses like brain-in-a-vat are irrelevant alternatives that don't need to be excluded. Ordinary knowledge claims are true in those ordinary contexts. The skeptic only 'wins' by changing the conversational context to one where skeptical alternatives become salient — and even then, ordinary knowledge claims made in everyday contexts remain retroactively true in those contexts.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does explicitly raising the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis in a conversation change what can be truly said about knowledge, according to the relevant alternatives theory?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Because the relevant alternatives theory treats 'knows' as context-sensitive: what counts as a relevant alternative — one that must be ruled out to count as knowledge — is determined by the conversational context. In ordinary contexts, far-fetched skeptical scenarios are irrelevant and need not be excluded. But when a philosopher explicitly raises the brain-in-a-vat scenario in conversation, it becomes salient and thereby relevant within that context. The standard for 'knows' rises to include excluding this alternative. Since no one can rule it out, knowledge claims become harder to assert — not because anyone's epistemic position changed, but because the contextually operative standard did.
The key philosophical move is that the relevant alternatives theory separates two things that naively seem linked: the objective epistemic situation of the knower (their evidence, reliability, cognitive access) and the contextual standard for knowledge attribution. The skeptic succeeds not by changing the world or your access to it, but by raising the conversational stakes. This explains both why everyday knowledge is genuine (ordinary contexts set low standards, consistent with having knowledge) and why philosophical discussion of skepticism feels genuinely threatening (the philosopher changes the standard by introducing the hypothesis). The theory thus dissolves rather than solves the skeptical problem.