Questions: Representationalism and Mental Representation

Question 1

What distinguishes representationalism about phenomenal consciousness from the uncontroversial claim that beliefs and desires have representational content?

• A. Representationalism about consciousness claims that all mental states are intentional
• B. Representationalism about consciousness claims that the 'feel' of experience — its phenomenal character — is itself constituted by representational content
• C. Representationalism denies that beliefs have propositional content
• D. Representationalism equates consciousness with computation

Answer: (B)

The uncontroversial claim is just that propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires) represent states of affairs. Representationalism about consciousness makes the much stronger claim that phenomenal 'what it's like' character — qualia, the redness of red — is constituted by or reducible to representational content. This is substantive and deeply contested.

Question 2

Inverted qualia thought experiments — in which two people share all representational content but have inverted phenomenal characters — would, if coherent, refute strong representationalism.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

Strong representationalism holds that phenomenal character is exhausted by representational content: same content, same experience. If inverted qualia are possible (same content, different feel), phenomenal properties cannot reduce to representational ones. The thought experiment is designed precisely to test this reduction.

Question 3

What is the key difference between strong and weak representationalism?

Model answer: Strong representationalism holds that phenomenal properties are fully reduced to or constituted by representational content. Weak representationalism holds only that phenomenal states necessarily have representational content — without claiming that content exhausts or explains the phenomenal character.

The distinction matters because weak representationalism is compatible with there being irreducible phenomenal properties 'above and beyond' representational content, while strong representationalism denies this. Inverted qualia challenge the strong version but not necessarily the weak version.