A neuroscientist can monitor Jones's brain and would have stimulated Jones to decide to vote for Candidate A if Jones were about to decide otherwise. In the actual case, Jones deliberates entirely on his own and decides to vote for A — no stimulation occurs. According to semicompatibilism, is Jones morally responsible for his vote?
ANo — Jones could not have voted otherwise, so by the Principle of Alternate Possibilities, he is not responsible
BYes — Jones deliberated freely and the decision was entirely his own; the counterfactual intervener's mere presence does not undermine responsibility
CNo — the fact that his choice was predetermined (he could not have done otherwise) removes the freedom required for responsibility
DIt depends on whether Jones was aware that the neuroscientist was monitoring him
This is a Frankfurt-style case, the very type that motivates semicompatibilism. Fischer's insight is that what matters for moral responsibility is the *actual causal history* of the decision, not counterfactual alternatives. Jones deliberated, weighed reasons, and decided on his own — the neuroscientist never intervened. The fact that intervention would have occurred had Jones chosen differently is irrelevant to whether *this* decision, produced by *this* mechanism, was genuinely his. Options A and C commit exactly the error semicompatibilism aims to correct: they treat alternate possibilities as required for responsibility.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
What does it mean for an agent's mechanism to be 'moderately reasons-responsive' in Fischer's account of moral responsibility?
AThe agent acts from fully rational deliberation on every occasion and could articulate reasons for every choice
BThe agent was able to do otherwise in the specific situation where the action occurred
CThe mechanism that produced the action would respond to at least some rational considerations in an appropriate range of scenarios, even if it wouldn't respond in every possible case
DThe agent consciously endorsed the reasons that caused her to act
Moderate reasons-responsiveness does not require perfect rationality or actual alternate possibilities — it requires a counterfactual sensitivity to reasons. If the agent's mechanism would have produced a different decision *had there been sufficient reasons to do so* across some suitable range of scenarios, the mechanism qualifies. This is deliberately 'moderate': it does not demand that the mechanism respond to every reason, only that it has genuine responsiveness to reason-giving considerations. A compulsive behavior that would not change regardless of any reason fails this test; normal deliberative action passes it.
Question 3 True / False
Semicompatibilism holds that both moral responsibility and the ability to do otherwise are compatible with determinism.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This is the most important thing to get right about the 'semi' in semicompatibilism. Fischer's view only claims that *moral responsibility* is compatible with determinism. He deliberately remains neutral on whether the *ability to do otherwise* (traditional free will) is compatible with determinism — he accepts that the Consequence Argument may be sound and that determinism may foreclose alternatives. By separating responsibility from alternate possibilities, he sidesteps that debate entirely. A full compatibilist claims both are compatible; Fischer only claims the responsibility half.
Question 4 True / False
On Fischer's semicompatibilism, a person with a compulsion that would persist even if she had decisive reasons to stop may lack moral responsibility for acting on that compulsion, even if her compulsive behavior is voluntary in the ordinary sense of not being coerced by another person.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Reasons-responsiveness is precisely what distinguishes responsible action from compulsive behavior in Fischer's framework. A compulsion is characterized by its resistance to reasons — the mechanism would not respond to even decisive rational considerations. If the compulsive mechanism would not stop even given compelling reasons, it fails the moderate reasons-responsiveness condition, and the agent is not responsible for actions issuing from it. This is different from voluntariness: acting without coercion is necessary but not sufficient for responsibility on this view.
Question 5 Short Answer
Why does Fischer call his view 'semicompatibilism' rather than simply 'compatibilism'? What is he remaining neutral about, and how does this neutrality allow him to sidestep the Consequence Argument?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Fischer accepts that the Consequence Argument — which concludes that determinism is incompatible with anyone ever having been able to do otherwise — may be sound. Rather than refuting it, he argues it is aimed at the wrong target. Standard compatibilism defends free will (ability to do otherwise) as compatible with determinism; Fischer only defends moral responsibility as compatible with determinism. Responsibility doesn't require alternate possibilities — Frankfurt cases show this. So even if determinism closes off all alternatives, that doesn't threaten responsibility, which requires only that the agent's reasons-responsive mechanism produced the action. 'Semi' flags that he takes no position on the free-will-determinism question, only the responsibility-determinism question.
This is a strategically clever move: instead of arguing about whether determinism forecloses alternatives (an intractable debate), Fischer changes the question to what moral responsibility actually requires. By showing that responsibility has different conditions than traditional freedom, he makes the Consequence Argument irrelevant to whether we can legitimately hold each other responsible. The philosophical payoff is redirecting attention from abstract modal questions about alternate worlds toward the concrete psychological and structural conditions — reasons-responsiveness and mechanism ownership — that actually ground our practices of praise and blame.