In Hobbes's version of the social contract, what is the structure of the agreement?
ACitizens contract with the sovereign to receive protection in exchange for their obedience
BCitizens contract with each other to submit to a common sovereign
CThe sovereign contracts with citizens to govern justly in exchange for their compliance
DAll citizens collectively agree on a constitution that limits the sovereign's power
For Hobbes, subjects contract with one another — each agreeing to give up the right to self-governance on condition that all others do likewise — and collectively hand authority to a sovereign who is not a party to the contract. The sovereign has no obligations under the contract and cannot breach it. This is why Hobbesian sovereignty is near-absolute: the sovereign is not bound by the agreement that created it.
Question 2 True / False
Social contract theorists typically hold that political authority was established through an actual historical agreement made by citizens at some founding moment.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
The social contract is almost universally presented as a hypothetical rational reconstruction — what free and equal individuals would agree to under idealized conditions — not a claim about history. Even Locke, who comes closest to a historical reading with his concept of tacit consent, is not asserting that citizens literally signed a document. Rawls's veil of ignorance makes the hypothetical character explicit.
Question 3 Short Answer
What role does the concept of the 'state of nature' play in social contract arguments, and why do theorists need it?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The state of nature is the baseline condition — what life would be like without political authority. It motivates the contract by showing what rational individuals are trying to escape or improve upon. Different characterizations of the state of nature (Hobbes's war of all against all, Locke's free but precarious condition, Rousseau's innocent natural freedom) lead to different conclusions about what the contract must deliver and how much authority is justified.
Without the state of nature, there is no basis for the hypothetical consent that grounds authority. The state of nature answers the question: why would rational persons give up any of their natural freedom? The answer depends on how bad (or good) life without political authority is assumed to be. This is why the three major contractarians reach such different conclusions — they start from very different characterizations of the pre-political baseline.