Compare two societies. In Society A, everyone earns $50,000 per year (perfectly equal). In Society B, everyone earns $200,000 per year except one person who earns $100,000 — both amounts exceed any plausible sufficiency threshold. What does sufficientarianism say about these distributions?
AA is more just than B because it is perfectly equal and equality has intrinsic moral value
BB is more just than A: everyone has more in absolute terms, and the inequality in B raises no justice concern of the same kind as deprivation since everyone is above the threshold
CB is less just because sufficientarianism holds that any inequality is morally problematic
DBoth are equally just because neither violates the principle of utility maximization
This is Frankfurt's core example: sufficientarianism evaluates distributions by whether everyone has *enough*, not by whether they have the *same*. In B, everyone — including the worst-off person — has far more than needed for a decent life. The residual inequality raises no justice concern of the same kind as deprivation. The egalitarian judgment (A is more just because equal) is precisely what Frankfurt's argument challenges.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
How does sufficientarianism reframe the justification for redistribution compared to egalitarianism?
ASufficientarianism opposes all redistribution as an unjust interference with market outcomes
BAn egalitarian redistributes to reduce the gap between rich and poor as such; a sufficientarian redistributes only to ensure no one falls below the threshold, and redistribution among those already above it requires a different justification
CSufficientarianism requires redistribution until total welfare is maximized, which is the same goal as egalitarianism
DSufficientarianism demands redistribution until perfect equality is achieved, the same endpoint as egalitarianism
The policy upshot of sufficientarianism is that the justice-based case for redistribution applies specifically to lifting people above the threshold — not to equalizing positions among those already above it. A sufficientarian supports aggressive anti-poverty programs but needs a different (non-justice-based) argument for taxing billionaires when the poor are already well-provided for. This is a genuine divergence from egalitarianism in practice.
Question 3 True / False
Sufficientarianism holds that once everyone is above the sufficiency threshold, most further inequalities are morally unproblematic and no justice objections can be raised against them.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
This overstates sufficientarianism's 'negative thesis' — the claim that above-threshold inequalities raise no justice concerns. Critics like Paula Casal argue this is implausible: enormous inequalities above the threshold seem to matter morally even when everyone is comfortable. Many sufficientarians accept the positive thesis (priority for those below the threshold) but hedge on the strong negative thesis. Sufficientarianism says above-threshold inequalities are not unjust in the *same way* deprivation is — not that they are unproblematic in every moral sense.
Question 4 True / False
A key difference between sufficientarianism and egalitarianism is that sufficientarianism uses an absolute standard ('does anyone have less than enough?') while egalitarianism uses a comparative standard ('does anyone have less than others?').
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Frankfurt's central argument is precisely this: egalitarianism asks the wrong comparative question. What actually matters morally is not whether people have the same, but whether they have what they need for a decent life — an absolute, not relative, standard. A world where everyone is wealthy but unequal is better than a world where everyone is equally impoverished, and sufficientarianism captures this intuition by shifting the target from 'same' to 'enough'.
Question 5 Short Answer
What is the 'sufficiency threshold' in sufficientarianism, and why is specifying it both essential and difficult?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: The threshold is the level of resources, welfare, or capabilities below which a person lacks what is needed for a decent life — and above which the distinctive sufficientarian concern (deprivation-as-injustice) does not apply in the same way. It is essential because the entire framework depends on distinguishing the morally urgent zone (below threshold) from the less urgent zone (above threshold). It is difficult because the threshold depends on contested empirical and normative claims about human flourishing, varies across social contexts, and different theorists set it at very different levels — from bare biological survival to full capabilities for education, political participation, and meaningful relationships. Set it too low and sufficientarianism permits extreme inequality; set it too high and it converges with demanding egalitarianism in practice.
The threshold problem is the main site of philosophical challenge for sufficientarianism. Without a principled account of where the threshold lies and why moral concern drops off above it, the view risks being either too permissive or indistinguishable from the egalitarianism it aims to replace.