Questions: Temporal Properties and Temporal Change

Question 1

You are standing now and will be sitting in an hour. The four-dimensionalist (perdurance) response to the problem of temporary intrinsics says:

• A. You are wholly present at each time, but 'being standing' and 'being sitting' are relations to times, not intrinsic properties
• B. Only the present moment is real, so only your current standing is instantiated
• C. The apparent contradiction dissolves because properties naturally come indexed to times
• D. You are a temporally extended object; your standing-stage and sitting-stage are distinct temporal parts, each bearing its property intrinsically

Answer: (D)

Four-dimensionalism (perdurance) resolves the problem by denying you are wholly present at each time. Instead, you are a four-dimensional object, and the apparently contradictory properties belong to distinct temporal parts — your standing-stage and your sitting-stage. Each part intrinsically has its property; no single entity bears both. Option A describes the endurance (relational) solution. Option B describes presentism. Option C is the tempting non-solution — see the short-answer question.

Question 2

What generates the problem of temporary intrinsics?

• A. We cannot measure properties like color or shape precisely enough at any given moment
• B. Three mutually plausible commitments jointly entail a contradiction: intrinsic properties don't depend on other things; objects persist and change such properties; an object cannot bear contradictory intrinsic properties simultaneously
• C. It is impossible to know whether an object's past properties were intrinsic or relational
• D. Temporal properties create circular definitions because being-seated requires referring to the same object at different times

Answer: (B)

The problem arises from three individually compelling claims that together entail a contradiction: (1) properties like being-seated are intrinsic — they depend only on the object itself; (2) a single persisting object can change such properties over time; (3) a single entity cannot simultaneously have contradictory intrinsic properties. All three seem correct, yet together they imply a persisting object must bear contradictory intrinsics. The three main theories each reject a different commitment.

Question 3

Four-dimensionalism (perdurance) resolves the problem of temporary intrinsics by holding that distinct temporal parts bear properties that would otherwise be contradictory if attributed to a single persisting object.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is the perdurance solution. You are a temporally extended four-dimensional worm; what look like contradictory properties of 'you' are non-contradictory properties of distinct temporal parts. The standing-stage has being-standing; the sitting-stage has being-sitting. Neither part has both. The apparent contradiction arises only if we wrongly assume you are wholly present at each moment.

Question 4

Simply saying 'an object has property P at time t and property Q at time t'' dissolves the problem of temporary intrinsics without requiring any further theoretical commitments.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This is the tempting but insufficient move. 'Having P at time t' must be cashed out. If being-seated is intrinsic, you cannot add 'at t' without making it a relation between the object and a time — which is exactly the endurance solution and carries non-trivial theoretical commitments (it denies these properties are intrinsic). If the properties remain intrinsic and the object is wholly present at both times, the contradiction persists. The locution 'at t' relocates rather than dissolves the problem.

Question 5

Why can't the problem of temporary intrinsics be dismissed by saying 'the object simply has different properties at different times'?

Model answer: This response seems to help but conceals the problem. If 'different properties at different times' is explained by turning intrinsic properties into relations to times (e.g., being-seated-at-t₁), that is a substantive theoretical move — the endurance solution — which denies these properties are truly intrinsic. If the properties remain genuinely intrinsic and the object is wholly present at both times, then a single entity simultaneously bears contradictory intrinsics, which is impossible. The problem's force comes from the combination of intrinsicness and persistence: there is no neutral way to say 'different times' without taking a stand on what kind of thing bears the property.

Presentism avoids the contradiction by denying past/future times are real. Perdurance avoids it by denying the object is wholly present at each time. Endurance avoids it by making the properties relational rather than intrinsic. All three are substantive positions. 'Different times' alone is not.