Questions: The A-Theory and B-Theory of Time

Question 1

A B-theorist analyzes the statement 'The signing of the Magna Carta is in the past.' According to the B-theory, what is the correct logical form of this claim?

• A. The signing of the Magna Carta has the intrinsic property of being-past, which it has genuinely acquired over time
• B. The signing of the Magna Carta stands in the relation earlier-than to the present utterance — a permanent, unchanging relational fact
• C. The signing of the Magna Carta no longer exists, since only present things are real
• D. The signing of the Magna Carta is moving from the future through the present into the past

Answer: (B)

The B-theory eliminates genuine temporal becoming. For a B-theorist, 'is past' means only 'is earlier than this utterance' — a relational, tenseless fact that holds permanently in the four-dimensional block. There is no intrinsic property of 'being past' that the event acquires over time (option A — that is the A-theory view). Option C states presentism (only present things exist), which is a separate metaphysical claim about existence, not about temporal properties. Option D describes temporal flow, which B-theorists deny.

Question 2

A philosopher argues: 'I accept the A-theory of time, therefore I must be committed to presentism — the view that only present objects exist.' What is wrong with this inference?

• A. Nothing — A-theory and presentism are logically equivalent positions
• B. A-theory is about the nature of temporal properties (whether A-properties are genuine and changing), while presentism is about what exists; accepting one does not force the other
• C. A-theory is compatible only with eternalism — the view that past, present, and future all exist equally
• D. Presentism is a linguistic position about tense, while A-theory is a metaphysical position about reality

Answer: (B)

A-theory and presentism are related but logically distinct. A-theory claims that A-properties (being past, present, future) are genuine, intrinsic, and changing. Presentism claims that only present entities exist. You can be an A-theorist while accepting that past and future things also exist, as long as you hold that the present is ontologically special. Conflating the two leads to confused arguments — e.g., relativity-based objections to presentism are sometimes mistakenly taken to refute the A-theory wholesale, when the positions are separable.

Question 3

According to the B-theory, 'the present moment' plays a metaphysically privileged role — it is the 'moving spotlight' advancing through the block of time.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

The moving spotlight is an A-theory metaphor — it is the claim that genuine temporal becoming occurs, with a privileged 'now' advancing from earlier to later times. The B-theory denies this entirely. For B-theorists, 'the present' is indexical and perspectival — it means whichever time the speaker is located at, but carries no intrinsic metaphysical privilege. Every time is equally real; none is specially 'the present' except relative to an observer. The moving spotlight picture is precisely what B-theorists say is an illusion projected by human psychology onto a static four-dimensional structure.

Question 4

The A-theory and B-theory of time disagree about whether there is genuine temporal becoming, and this disagreement is logically distinct from the debate between presentism and eternalism.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

A/B-theory and presentism/eternalism are two independent axes. A/B-theory concerns the nature of temporal properties: does 'being present' name an intrinsic, changing property (A-theory) or merely a relational, perspectival description (B-theory)? Presentism/eternalism concerns what exists: do only present things exist (presentism) or do all temporal stages exist equally (eternalism)? While many A-theorists are presentists and many B-theorists are eternalists, the logical connections are not forced. Keeping these debates separate is essential for evaluating arguments that inadvertently conflate them.

Question 5

What is the fundamental philosophical difference between the A-theory and B-theory of time? What is genuinely at stake between the two views?

Model answer: The B-theory holds that all times are metaphysically equivalent, related only by the permanent, tenseless relation of earlier/later-than. Temporal language like 'the battle was fought' is just a perspectival way of expressing an unchanging relational fact. Time is like space: 'past' is a relation, not an intrinsic property, and temporal flow is a psychological illusion. The A-theory insists that A-properties (past, present, future) are genuine, intrinsic, and genuinely changing properties of events. The Battle of Hastings was future, then present, then past — and these transitions are real features of the world, not mere perspectives. The present moment is metaphysically special. What is at stake is whether temporal becoming is a real feature of reality or a projection of experience onto a static four-dimensional structure.

The debate connects to physics (does special relativity settle it?), phenomenology (can the experience of flow be explained away?), and language philosophy (do tenses refer to something real?). Neither side has a decisive argument, which is why the debate remains live.