Two farmers live in Hobbes's state of nature — no government, no law. Even if both farmers are peaceful by disposition and would prefer to cooperate, Hobbes would argue that:
AEach has rational reasons to attack the other preemptively — because the fear of being struck first makes aggression the safer strategy even for peaceful people
BThey would cooperate naturally, since rational people recognize the mutual benefit of peace
CThe stronger farmer would dominate the weaker, establishing a natural hierarchy
DA religious or traditional authority would naturally emerge to mediate disputes
This is the core logic of Hobbes's state of nature — and it does not require assuming people are evil. Roughly equal capacity for harm plus the absence of enforcement creates a structural dilemma: even a peaceful person, knowing the other might strike first, is better off striking preemptively. Both farmers might prefer peace, but neither can guarantee the other will choose it, so preemptive aggression becomes individually rational. The 'war of all against all' arises from rational self-interest in the absence of a sovereign, not from innate wickedness.
Question 2 Multiple Choice
Hobbes's argument for absolute sovereignty was philosophically radical in 1651 primarily because:
AIt grounded political authority in secular rational consent rather than divine right or tradition
BIt was the first philosophical argument for monarchy in European history
CIt argued that citizens should choose their sovereign through democratic elections
DIt denied that human nature was selfish, proposing instead that people are naturally cooperative
The radical innovation in Leviathan was methodological: Hobbes derived political authority from human nature and rational self-interest, not from God's will, divine right, or historical precedent. In 1651 this was audacious — it meant any monarch's legitimacy depended on fulfilling the social contract (providing security), not on lineage or divine appointment. The argument was simultaneously conservative in its conclusion (absolute sovereignty), making it controversial from nearly every direction.
Question 3 True / False
According to Hobbes, subjects may justly resist the sovereign whenever the sovereign acts unjustly, cruelly, or in violation of moral law.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: False
For Hobbes, the only legitimate ground for resistance is when the sovereign fails to protect the subject's life — the single purpose for which the social contract was created. Injustice, cruelty, or bad governance do not justify rebellion, because the costs of undermining sovereignty (returning to the state of nature) always exceed the costs of enduring bad rule. If subjects can override the sovereign whenever they judge governance 'wrong,' the sovereign's authority becomes meaningless and the state of nature's logic returns.
Question 4 True / False
Hobbes grounded political legitimacy in human rational consent and self-interest, making his argument secular rather than based on divine right or hereditary authority.
TTrue
FFalse
Answer: True
Leviathan's central innovation is that the sovereign's authority derives from the rational agreement of subjects seeking security, not from God's mandate or royal bloodlines. Hobbes constructs his argument from premises about human nature without significant appeal to religion. This made his justification available for any form of sovereign — including a republic — not just hereditary monarchs. It also made the argument conditional: if the sovereign consistently fails to provide security, the rational basis for obedience dissolves.
Question 5 Short Answer
Explain why Hobbes concluded that sovereignty must be absolute and undivided. What does his logic of the state of nature imply about what happens if subjects can override the sovereign under any circumstances?
Think about your answer, then reveal below.
Model answer: Hobbes argued that the problem in the state of nature is the absence of a final authority to enforce agreements and resolve disputes. If subjects can override the sovereign whenever they judge its actions wrong, then sovereignty is conditional — and a conditional sovereign cannot reliably enforce the social contract. The moment subjects believe they have the right to resist 'unjust' commands, each person becomes the judge of what is just, and the enforcement problem that creates the state of nature reasserts itself. Absolute sovereignty is Hobbes's solution: a final, undivided authority removes the ambiguity that makes the state-of-nature dilemma inescapable.
The logic is deductive: state of nature → perpetual war (no enforcement) → subjects rationally transfer rights to a sovereign → sovereign enforces the contract. If the sovereign's authority is divided or limited, disputes about who has final say reproduce the enforcement problem. Hobbes saw the English Civil War — a conflict between king and parliament over the boundary of each authority — as empirical confirmation of his theory. Later theorists like Locke accepted the state-of-nature framework but disputed Hobbes's pessimistic premises, arguing that limited government and rights of resistance are consistent with social stability.