Questions: Trope Theory

Question 1

According to trope theory, when two roses are both red, what accounts for their 'sharing' that property?

• A. Both roses instantiate the same universal — redness — which is wholly present in each
• B. The word 'red' is a convenient label we apply to similar-looking objects, with no real property involved
• C. Each rose has its own numerically distinct redness-trope; the two tropes exactly resemble each other but are not identical
• D. The roses' redness-tropes are parts of a single distributed universal that exists across both

Answer: (C)

Trope theory holds that properties are abstract particulars — this redness is a numerically distinct entity from that redness. The two roses do not share a single entity (as universals realism says, option A); rather, each has its own redness-trope, and those two distinct tropes stand in a relation of exact resemblance. Option B describes sparse nominalism, which denies properties are real at all. Option D mischaracterizes tropes by making them parts of a universal, which contradicts the trope theorist's core commitment to particularity.

Question 2

What is the 'resemblance regress' objection to trope theory, and what is the standard trope-theoretic response?

• A. Tropes cannot explain why objects have the properties they do, since tropes are just names for clusters of qualities
• B. If two tropes resemble each other, we need a further trope to explain their resemblance, leading to an infinite chain — trope theorists respond that exact resemblance between tropes is a primitive, unanalyzable fact
• C. Since tropes are particulars, they cannot ground general laws of nature, which requires universals — trope theorists concede this point
• D. Tropes require a substratum to hold them together, reinstating the bare particular that bundle theory tries to eliminate

Answer: (B)

The resemblance regress asks: if two redness-tropes are exactly alike, what makes them similar? Invoking a resemblance universal would reintroduce universals through the back door. The standard trope-theoretic response is to treat resemblance between exactly similar tropes as a metaphysical primitive — a brute, unanalyzable fact. Critics find this unsatisfying; defenders argue that primitive resemblances between particulars are more parsimonious than a separate ontological category of universals. This is the central ongoing debate about trope theory's adequacy.

Question 3

According to trope theory, two objects with exactly the same color have two numerically distinct tropes that exactly resemble each other.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is the central commitment of trope theory. Even perfect, exact similarity between two property-instances does not make them numerically identical — each trope is as particular as the object it belongs to. This redness of this apple and that redness of that apple are two distinct entities related by exact resemblance, not two instances of one shared entity. This distinguishes trope theory from universals realism, where identical properties would be literally the same entity wholly present in each object.

Question 4

Trope theory successfully avoids most primitive or unanalyzable facts by reducing properties to resemblance classes of particulars.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

Trope theory replaces one primitive (universals) with another (primitive resemblance between exactly similar tropes). The resemblance relation between tropes cannot itself be analyzed in terms of a shared universal without circularity, so trope theorists must treat exact resemblance as a brute metaphysical fact. This is the force of the resemblance regress objection. Whether this tradeoff favors trope theory is contested — it is not an elimination of primitives, but a substitution of one kind for another.

Question 5

What is the resemblance regress problem for trope theory, and how do trope theorists typically respond to it?

Model answer: The regress asks: what makes two exactly similar tropes resemble each other? If we say they share a resemblance universal, we have reintroduced universals. If we say they resemble because of a further trope of resemblance, that trope needs explaining too, generating an infinite regress. Trope theorists respond that exact resemblance between tropes is a primitive — a basic, unanalyzable fact that needs no further grounding.

The regress is a genuine challenge because trope theory's appeal is its nominalist-friendly ontology: everything that exists is particular. But if resemblance itself is a universal, the ontology is no longer purely nominalist. Treating resemblance as primitive stops the regress but invites the objection that this is just as mysterious as positing universals directly. The debate turns on which theoretical primitive is more acceptable — a category of universals, or brute facts about resemblances between particulars.