Questions: Tropes versus Universals

Question 1

Two red fire trucks are parked side by side. How does trope theory explain the fact that both trucks are red?

• A. Both trucks instantiate the same entity — the universal redness — which is wholly present in each
• B. Each truck has its own distinct redness-trope; the trucks count as both being red because their respective redness-tropes are members of a resemblance class of exactly-resembling tropes
• C. 'Red' is just a general word humans apply to similar-looking things, with no real entity corresponding to it in either truck
• D. The trucks share a trope — a single redness-trope that is distributed between them

Answer: (B)

Trope theory holds that properties are abstract particulars — each object has its own numerically distinct property-instance. The two trucks do not share a single redness (that's the universalist view). Instead, each has its own redness-trope, and property-sharing is analyzed as resemblance between distinct tropes: both tropes belong to the same resemblance class of exactly-resembling color-tropes, which plays the role a universal would play in the competing theory. Option C is strict nominalism, which denies any property-entity exists. Option D confuses the theories — tropes are never shared.

Question 2

What problem in universals theory does trope theory specifically avoid?

• A. The problem of abstract entities — universals are too abstract to have causal powers
• B. The problem of immanent universals — if a universal must be 'in' each object that instantiates it, a single entity would need to be wholly present in multiple spatially separated objects simultaneously
• C. The problem of predication — universals cannot explain how general terms apply to individuals
• D. The problem of nominalism — universals are too specific to explain general concepts

Answer: (B)

Immanent (in re) universalism faces a spatial puzzle: if redness is wholly present in this truck AND wholly present in that truck across town, how can one entity be in two places at once? Trope theory sidesteps this entirely: each truck has its own redness-trope, and no single entity needs to be multiply located. The resemblance relation between tropes handles the 'same property' talk without requiring any entity to span spatial distance. This is trope theory's key advantage over immanent universalism (though transcendent Platonist universals, placed outside space, face a different version of this problem).

Question 3

According to trope theory, the redness of one red ball and the redness of another red ball are numerically the same entity — they share one redness-trope.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: False

This is the universalist claim, not the trope theorist's. Trope theory holds that each object has its own, numerically distinct property-instance: the first ball's redness-trope and the second ball's redness-trope are two different entities. They are *qualitatively* identical (maximally resembling) but *numerically* distinct — the same distinction as between two identical twin humans who are qualitatively very similar but numerically two people. Tropes being numerically distinct is what makes them particulars; being qualitatively identical is what grounds our property-talk about them 'sharing a color.'

Question 4

Trope theory occupies a middle position between universalism and strict nominalism by positing abstract particulars — entities that are property-like but each belong to exactly one object.

• T. True
• F. False

Answer: True

This is the defining structural claim of trope theory. Strict nominalists about properties say there are no property-entities — 'red' is just a general term, full stop. Universalists say there is one shared entity (the universal redness) present in all red things. Trope theorists split the difference: there ARE property-entities (so we can ground predication and resemblance in real things, not just words), but each is a particular (belonging to exactly one object, never shared). This middle position gives trope theory more ontological resources than nominalism while avoiding universalism's multiply-located entities.

Question 5

What is the key explanatory cost trope theory pays in exchange for avoiding multiply-located universals, and why does this represent a genuine philosophical challenge rather than a trivial issue?

Model answer: Trope theory explains property-sharing through resemblance between distinct tropes rather than through identity with a shared universal. But this shifts the explanatory burden: resemblance between tropes must itself be explained. If we ask why two redness-tropes resemble each other exactly, the trope theorist cannot say 'because they both instantiate the same universal redness' without collapsing back into universalism. If they say resemblance between tropes is a primitive, unanalyzed relation, they may be accused of explaining the obscure (why two things share a property) by appeal to the equally obscure (why two tropes resemble). The circularity threat — resemblance requiring explanation that circles back to property-identity — is the central challenge trope theory must handle carefully.

This challenge is philosophically serious because the whole motivation for trope theory was to explain property-sharing without multiply-located universals. If the resemblance relation between tropes is itself a universal (a shared relation that all resembling pairs instantiate), we've reintroduced universals through the back door. Trope theorists have various responses: some treat resemblance as a primitive, accepting it as a brute fact; others analyze it through further tropes; still others accept a modest universalism about relations while maintaining particular property-tropes. Each response has costs. The debate shows that ontological choices in metaphysics always involve tradeoffs.